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VOLUME 34, NUMBER 4

**THE** *Southwestern*  
**SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY**

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
The Actual Costs of Home Ownership

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Annual Convention Program

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# Cumulative Voting: An Effective Electoral Device in Illinois Politics

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CUMULATIVE VOTING was adopted in Illinois in 1870 as an electoral reform to remedy the condition of sectional representation that characterized the lower legislative chamber under the Constitution of 1848. Under this document, district representation was virtually supplanted by sectional representation with the Republican party, entrenched in the northern half of the state, winning all the senatorial and representative seats from that portion of the state with but few exceptions, and the Democratic party, stronger in the southern section, electing nearly all the legislators from that half of the state.<sup>1</sup>

In theory, cumulative voting seemed the answer to this problem of representation, for its three principal characteristics all aim to achieve a just degree of minority representation. It retains the district system of representation, but with the district as the unit for the selection of three representatives rather than one. The reason for this is apparent. In single-member districts, the leading party alone would win representation. In two-member districts, the minority party might win half the representation, which would be disproportionate. In establishing three-member districts in Illinois, it was hoped that the result would usually be two seats for the majority party and one seat for the minority. This would give the minority sufficient representa-

<sup>1</sup> The degree to which this situation obtained can be illustrated by a breakdown of the party alignments in the Twenty-fifth Session of the Illinois House of Representatives in 1867. The Democrats won only five seats in districts lying north of the state capital of Springfield, and the Republicans won only seven seats below this line of political division. On the basis of party votes cast for president of the United States in the election of 1868, there were 120,061 Democratic voters in districts lying north of the state capital with only five members of their own party to speak for them in the General Assembly. These five representatives came from districts in which the Democratic vote for president was only 13,146, leaving 106,915 Democratic party voters unrepresented by members of their own party in the Illinois House. Republican voters in districts below Springfield, as reflected by the presidential vote, totaled 78,737. The seven Republican representatives from this section came from districts casting 22,168 votes, leaving 56,568 Republican voters who were not represented by members of their own party in the Illinois House. The election statistics cited above are from John Moes, *Illinois, Historical and Statistical* (Chicago, 1892), II, 1208-11.

tion to be heard on all questions affecting its rights and interests and yet maintain the accepted rule of the majority.

A second characteristic of cumulative voting is multiple voting. Each voter is entitled to cast as many votes as there are representatives to be elected. In the exercise of these votes, the elector enjoys a free and unrestrained ballot, as he may cumulate his votes for a single candidate or distribute them equally or unequally among two or three candidates. In the three-member districts of Illinois, the elector has three votes, which can be cast in any of the following ways: (1) all three votes can be given to a single candidate; (2) the three votes can be equally divided between two candidates with each receiving a vote and a half; (3) the three votes can be equally divided among three candidates with each receiving one vote; (4) two votes can be given to one candidate with the third vote going to a second candidate.<sup>2</sup>

A third characteristic of cumulative voting is that its aim is minority representation rather than proportional representation, thereby distinguishing it from the Hare Plan, the list system, and other proposals. Members elected from any representative district will usually be the agents of the two largest political groups within that district. Third parties might win assembly seats under this system, but in most cases these seats would be in certain districts in which a third party had supplanted the second party of the other districts as the largest minority group.<sup>3</sup> Thus, cumulative voting is largely a device for the maintenance of a strong two-party system and a means for reflecting the relative strength of the two largest political groups within the total area of the political unit in its popularly elected assemblies.

Since the general election of 1872, cumulative voting has been in continuous use as the method for electing members to the Illinois House of Representatives. This period of eighty years and forty-one general elections affords an ample test, and certain general observations can be made on the system and its accomplishments as reflected in the composition and performance of the lower legislative assembly.

A comparison of recent political conditions in Illinois with those prevailing eighty years ago would hardly furnish a complete test of the effectiveness of cumulative voting as an electoral device. Thus, the legislatures of four other Midwestern states—Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin—have been selected for a comparative study with the Illinois House of Representatives on certain points. These five state assemblies are similar in general

<sup>2</sup> This division of votes was upheld by a majority decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of *Allen v. Fuller*, 322 Ill. 304 (1929).

<sup>3</sup> Eleven so-called "third" parties have been represented in the Illinois House of Representatives since the adoption of cumulative voting in 1870: Farmers' Alliance, Greenback, Independent, Independent Democrat, Independent Republican, Labor, People's, Progressive, Prohibition, Public Ownership, and Socialist. Only the two major parties have won representation since 1922.

composition and make-up. They range in size from 100 members in Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin, to 108 in Iowa, and 153 in Illinois; all five assemblies meet in early January of odd-numbered years, with session length unlimited except in Indiana. There are, however, significant differences in these five legislative chambers with respect to compensation and means of election. Reimbursement for legislative service varies from a low of \$2,000 per two-year session in Iowa, to \$1,200 per year in Indiana, to \$2,400 per year in Michigan and Wisconsin, and to \$3,000 per year in Illinois. In addition to base salary, each state grants its legislators some allowance for mileage, stationery, and other minor expenditures.<sup>4</sup> The difference in base salary, however, is sufficiently large to account, in part, for differences in the willingness of state representatives to seek re-election in the five states, and, as a result, in differences in tenure of representatives.

The second major difference concerns the electoral system for electing state representatives. The four selected states all employ the single-member district means of representation under which a simple majority or plurality of votes is sufficient to elect one candidate over the other candidate or candidates. Thus, it would seem that major differences, other than tenure, which exist between the composition and operation of the Illinois House of Representatives and the lower assemblies of the other selected states must be traced in large part to cumulative voting, the system of electing representatives peculiar to Illinois.

As a test of the effectiveness of cumulative voting as an electoral device, these five state assemblies will be compared with respect to several features that are generally advanced as desirable characteristics in a legislative body. These characteristics are: (1) presence of experienced lawmakers; (2) presence of a working majority by the assembly's leading party; (3) lack of cleavage between the leading party in the assembly and the party of the governor; (4) minority representation; (5) absence of political landslides in party shifts from session to session; (6) reflection of relative party strength in the composition of the assembly; (7) voter's choice of candidates in the general election.

Two sets of data for the five states have been selected as the basis for the comparison outlined above. First, the three legislative sessions of 1929, 1939, and 1949—one in each of the last three decades—have been selected. These particular sessions were chosen because they seemed to be those in which the conditions of the decade were least disturbed. The second set of data covers the last nine sessions of the five assemblies beginning with the session of 1937 and continuing through the session of 1953. These

<sup>4</sup> Data on these state legislative chambers is taken from *Book of the States, 1952-53* (Chicago, Council of State Governments, 1952), IX, 93-95.

sessions were selected for detailed study and observation since they give recent comparative data for these assemblies.

### *Presence of Experienced Lawmakers*

The belief that long, continuous legislative experience is essential to competent legislation has long been expressed by observers of the legislative process and by persons who speak from personal knowledge. The usual reasoning of these spokesmen is that it is only actual experience in the legislative body that enables a legislator to acquaint himself with the intricacies of governmental machinery, to exercise sound judgment with respect to the improvement of public administration, to learn to distinguish between public interest and selfish demand, and to develop the faculty for compromise and bargain so necessary in the making of decisions applicable to groups antagonistic to each other in their wants.

Such a testimonial statement comes from Dr. Charles S. Hyneman, who has made a number of significant studies of tenure and turnover in the American state legislatures. In support of the assumption that legislative experience and legislative competence are closely related, Dr. Hyneman has stated:

But the case for experience in the lawmaking process need not be rested solely upon the need for adeptness in maneuvering. Each program of public policy must root itself in a mass of existing legislation; and each body of law-makers, whether eager to push forward or concerned to preserve the status quo, will profit from a thorough acquaintance with what is already in the statute books. Intelligent legislation is furthered also by close acquaintance with the procedures and ways of agencies, private and governmental, that put so much of legislative policy into execution. Old-timers in the legislature are more likely than newcomers to possess this needed familiarity with existing legislation and with the ways of these persons and groups that transform the black words of a statute into patterns of action.<sup>8</sup>

On the point of accumulated legislative experience, the record of the Illinois House of Representatives stands high among the lower legislative houses of the American states. The effect of cumulative voting on tenure in the Illinois House became evident soon after its adoption. A study of the experience of Illinois representatives in the ten sessions preceding the adoption of cumulative voting (1850-68) showed that only 11.2 per cent of the members had served in the immediately preceding session. A similar study of House membership in the first ten sessions following the adop-

<sup>8</sup> Charles S. Hyneman, "Tenure and Turnover of Legislative Personnel," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 195 (January, 1938), 21-31.

tion of cumulative voting (1872-90) revealed that 17.5 per cent of the members had served in the previous session.<sup>6</sup>

That the adoption of cumulative voting is the most satisfactory explanation of this tendency to re-elect House members becomes apparent on the basis of a similar study of this phenomenon in the Illinois Senate. In the ten-election period preceding its adoption, 14.8 per cent of the senators were members of the previous Senate, whereas in the ten sessions following the adoption of the new constitution only 12.9 per cent of the senators were members of the previous Senate. If conditions other than cumulative voting had been responsible for the change in elections to the House, a similar reaction should have been evident in the Senate. Actually, the change was in the opposite direction.<sup>7</sup>

Table 1 presents the results of a comparative study of legislative tenure in Illinois and in four selected Midwestern states not employing cumulative voting in the selected sessions of 1929, 1939, and 1949.

TABLE 1

Comparative Tenure of Members in the Lower Legislative Houses in Five States for the Selected Sessions of 1929, 1939, 1949

Year	State	Serving 1st Term		Serving 2nd-3rd Terms		Serving 4th Terms or More	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1929	Illinois	40	26	52	34	61	40
	Indiana	48	48	40	40	12	12
	Iowa	51	47	40	37	17	16
	Michigan	39	39	39	39	22	22
	Wisconsin	46	46	35	35	19	19
1939	Illinois	37	24	49	32	67	44
	Indiana	50	50	39	39	11	11
	Iowa	55	51	44	41	9	8
	Michigan	43	43	44	44	13	13
	Wisconsin	42	42	40	40	18	18
1949	Illinois	31	20	38	25	84	55
	Indiana	65	65	15	15	20	20
	Iowa	51	47	37	34	20	19
	Michigan	40	40	31	31	29	29
	Wisconsin	37	37	30	30	33	33

Three significant facts concerning tenure of House members in these five states are evident from this table. The first is the large number of first-

<sup>6</sup> Charles S. Hyndman and Julian D. Morgan, "Cumulative Voting in Illinois," *Illinois Law Review*, 32 (May, 1937), 27.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

term lawmakers, with the comparative average ratios of inexperienced members in the five states being as follows: Illinois, one of four; Michigan, two of five; Wisconsin, two of five; Iowa, nearly one of two; and Indiana, slightly higher than one of two. The second significant feature revealed is the comparative number of members with limited legislative experience. The percentages of members serving their first, second, or third term in the respective assemblies are as follows: Illinois, 50.3 per cent; Wisconsin, 76.7 per cent; Michigan, 78.7 per cent; and Indiana and Iowa, 85.7 per cent. The third fact revealed is the comparative number of legislators with four or more sessions of previous experience. Illinois easily comes off with top honors again with the comparative percentages on this point being thus: Illinois, 46.3 per cent; Wisconsin, 23.3 per cent; Michigan, 18 per cent; and Indiana and Iowa both with 14.3 per cent.

Thus the assumption that there is a relationship between cumulative voting and legislative stability in the Illinois House of Representatives is bolstered by this comparative study. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the system is wholly or even largely responsible for this difference in tenure, for there may be other variables that greatly influence the tenure of members in the assemblies of the five states. One such variable might be the salary difference in the five states, mentioned earlier; also to be considered are differences in the degree of partisanship, in length of sessions, in frequency of special sessions, etc. Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that cumulative voting is in part responsible for the relatively high degree of membership stability achieved in the Illinois House.

### *Presence of Working Majority*

The crux of the problem of deciding whether or not the leading party in a legislative assembly has a working majority lies in determining what constitutes a "working majority." On all purely legislative matters in most states, a constitutional majority—that is, a simple majority of all members—is sufficient for passage. Thus, it seems that a fair criterion of a "working majority" in a given assembly is that the members of the leading party number at least one more than the members of all other parties combined.

With a constitutional majority as the standard, the leading party in the Illinois House of Representatives has had a working majority in all but two sessions since the adoption of cumulative voting. These were the sessions of 1875 and 1913, in which the balance of power was held, respectively, by the Independents with 41 seats and the Progressives with 26 seats. Since the present legislative apportionment of 1902—a period of twenty-six legislative sessions—there have been nine sessions in which the leading party had a working majority of 25 seats or more, eight sessions in which the majority was between 15 and 24 seats, eight sessions in

which the majority was between 5 and 14 seats, and only one session—that of 1913—in which there was no majority party.

Examination of party majorities in the Illinois Senate shows that the leading party in that assembly has had a working majority in all but two sessions since 1902—those of 1913 and 1915. As regards size of majorities in the last twenty-six sessions, the leading party has had a majority of 25 or more seats on nine occasions, a majority of 15 to 24 seats on ten occasions, a majority of 5 to 14 seats on five occasions, and no majority in the two sessions mentioned already.

It is interesting to compare the size of party majorities in the Illinois legislative chambers with the majorities in the chambers of the other selected states. Table 2 does this by giving the majorities of the leading party in both legislative chambers and the party of the governor for each of the last nine legislative sessions.

It can readily be seen that Illinois is on a par with the other selected states in the matter of the leading party having a "working majority" in the legislative chambers. During the period selected, the leading party has always had such a majority in both Illinois chambers, as has been the case in both assemblies in Indiana and Michigan. There was no working majority in one session of the Iowa House, in one session of the Wisconsin House, and in two sessions of the Wisconsin Senate.

#### *Lack of Cleavage Between Majority Legislative Party and Governor*

Since the election of 1872, when cumulative voting went into effect, the party that elected the governor has on every occasion also been returned as the majority party in the Illinois House of Representatives. In all but two sessions, those of 1875 and 1913, this control has been a majority of all members.

On five occasions, however, the control of the Illinois House has changed in the off-year election to the opposite party from that which the governor represented. These elections were in 1890, when the Democrats won control of the House with a Republican governor, and in 1894, 1914, 1938, and 1950, when the Republicans came into control of the House under a Democratic administration. In each of these off-year elections, the party that won control of the House also elected the state treasurer. In addition, the party winning control of the House in the off-year elections in each of these five instances maintained or increased its control in the next general election and succeeded in electing the governor. It seems fair, therefore, to say that the party cleavage between the House and governor was due more to the four-year term of the chief executive than to the system of cumulative voting.

It is interesting to note that since 1872 the Illinois Senate has also been

TABLE 2

Party Majorities in Nine Sessions of Five Selected State Legislatures

Year	State	House Majority		Senate Majority		Party of Governor
		Republican	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	
1937	Illinois	..	19	..	13	Dem.
	Iowa	No majority		6	..	Dem.
	Indiana	..	54	..	26	Dem.
	Michigan	..	20	..	2	Dem.
	Wisconsin	No majority		No majority		Prog.
1939	Illinois	5	..	..	11	Dem.
	Indiana	2	..	..	18	Dem.
	Iowa	70	..	26	..	Rep.
	Michigan	46	..	14	..	Rep.
	Wisconsin	6	..	No majority		Rep.
1941	Illinois	5	..	5	..	Rep.
	Indiana	28	..	12	..	Dem.
	Iowa	64	..	40	..	Rep.
	Michigan	36	..	12	..	Dem.
	Wisconsin	20	..	15	..	Rep.
1943	Illinois	15	..	5	..	Rep.
	Indiana	64	..	26	..	Dem.
	Iowa	88	..	40	..	Rep.
	Michigan	48	..	18	..	Rep.
	Wisconsin	46	..	13	..	Rep.
1945	Illinois	5	..	17	..	Rep.
	Indiana	38	..	24	..	Rep.
	Iowa	74	..	40	..	Rep.
	Michigan	32	..	16	..	Rep.
	Wisconsin	50	..	19	..	Rep.
1947	Illinois	23	..	25	..	Rep.
	Indiana	78	..	26	..	Rep.
	Iowa	88	..	42	..	Rep.
	Michigan	90	..	24	..	Rep.
	Wisconsin	76	..	21	..	Rep.
1949	Illinois	..	9	15	..	Dem.
	Indiana	..	20	6	..	Dem.
	Iowa	50	..	36	..	Rep.
	Michigan	22	..	14	..	Dem.
	Wisconsin	48	..	23	..	Rep.
1951	Illinois	15	..	9	..	Dem.
	Indiana	38	..	2	..	Dem.
	Iowa	78	..	32	..	Rep.
	Michigan	32	..	20	..	Dem.
	Wisconsin	52	..	19	..	Rep.
1953	Illinois	19	..	25	..	Rep.
	Indiana	62	..	30	..	Rep.
	Iowa	102	..	42	..	Rep.
	Michigan	32	..	16	..	Dem.
	Wisconsin	50	..	19	..	Rep.

controlled by the party opposite to that of the governor in five sessions. In addition, the Senate during the 1915-17 biennium was equally divided between the two major parties, with the balance of power in the hands of a single Progressive-party member.

As a before-and-after comparison on this point, it should be observed that the Illinois House of Representatives was controlled four times by the party in opposition to that of the governor in the twenty-year period immediately preceding the adoption of cumulative voting,<sup>8</sup> as compared to only five times in the eighty years since its adoption. Thus, cumulative voting cannot justly be blamed for the few occasions on which this cleavage has existed since its adoption.

Again it is interesting to compare the frequency of this occurrence in Illinois politics with the frequency of such cleavage in the other selected states. By referring to Table 2 above, it can be seen that the Illinois legislature compares favorably with those of the other states on this criterion. Cleavage has occurred in two of the last nine sessions of the Illinois House and Senate in one House session in Wisconsin, in one House and one Senate session in Iowa, and in four House and Senate sessions in Michigan and Indiana. Of these five states, only Indiana and Illinois have four-year terms for their governors, which probably accounts for some of the cleavage in those states. In Iowa and Wisconsin, the term of the governor coincides with that of the members of the lower house and the governor's term in Michigan coincides with that of members of both legislative houses. Thus such cleavage in those states cannot be attributed to the differing terms of the two governmental agencies.

### *Minority Representation*

In this discussion it should be borne in mind that the system of cumulative voting is meant to result in fair representation of the minority in the total membership of the lower legislative assembly and in the three representatives selected in each election district. On both points, the system has been quite successful. With but few exceptions, at least two parties have been represented in every senatorial district in every election of members to the House of Representatives. Since the election of 1872, one party has succeeded in electing all three representatives in only thirty-two districts or in only 1.5 per cent of the district elections. Since 1942, the only district returning three members of the same party has been the Twenty-seventh Senatorial District of Chicago, in which the Democrats have elected all three representatives in each of the last six biennial elections.

<sup>8</sup> These were the sessions of 1857, 1859, and 1863, when the Democrats controlled the House under a Republican administration, and the session of 1855, when the Republicans controlled the House under a Democratic chief executive.

By referring again to Table 2, it can be seen that the largest majority that the leading party has enjoyed over the minority party in the last nine sessions of the Illinois House was a 23-vote majority held by the Republican party in the 1947 session. The average majority for this period is only 13, making the minority party a real factor in each session. This margin is quite small in comparison to the House majorities in the other selected states during this nine-election period. The largest and the average majorities that the leading party has enjoyed in the other states are as follows: Indiana, a 76-vote Republican majority in 1947 and an average majority of 43 seats; in Iowa, a 102-vote Republican majority in 1953 and an average majority of 68 seats; in Michigan, a 90-vote Republican majority in 1947 and an average majority of 40 seats; and in Wisconsin, a 76-vote Republican majority in 1947 and an average majority of 39 seats.

Thus, the minority party has been a real factor in the composition of the House in each of the last nine sessions in Illinois, whereas it has had but token representation in one or more of these sessions in the lower assemblies in each of the four selected states.

#### *Shifts in Party Composition*

Political landslides occur when the electorate votes one party out of power and elects a second party to a significant majority of offices. Such a landslide in legislative assemblies occurs when a party with a substantial minority in one session is advanced to the role of the majority party in the succeeding session. This often thrusts control of a legislative body upon a group of legislative neophytes with little or no previous experience in the art of law-making.

By again referring to Table 2, it can be seen that cumulative voting has functioned to temper the tendency for such landslides in the Illinois House. The greatest shift in the party composition of this assembly in the last nine sessions occurred in the election of 1948 when the Democratic party gained a 9-seat majority after being in the minority by 23 seats following the previous election. This was a gain of 32 seats, while the average gain for the nine-session period was only 13 seats.

This is a minor turnover in comparison to that experienced in the other four states, where major landslides have occurred in one or more of the last nine sessions. Greatest turnovers in these four states during this period were as follows: in Indiana, the Democrats gained a 20-seat majority in the 1949 House after having a 66-seat minority in the 1947 House; in Iowa, the greatest shift was from a 54 to 54 split in the 1937 House to an 89 to 19 division in favor of the Republicans in the 1939 House; in Michigan, the Republicans gained a 73 to 27 advantage in the 1939 House after having a 20-seat minority in the preceding session; and in Wisconsin, the Republicans

held 53 seats in the 1939 House as compared to 21 seats in 1937, while the Progressive-party membership dropped from 48 seats in 1937 to 31 seats in 1939 and the Democratic strength dropped from 31 seats to 15.

Thus political landslides have not occurred in the party composition of the Illinois House of Representatives to the extent that they have occurred in the lower assemblies of these four other Midwestern states.

### *Reflection of Party Strength*

Cumulative voting has resulted in a close approach to true proportional representation in the last seven sessions of the Illinois House of Representatives. As shown in Table 3, below, the composition of this assembly is an

TABLE 3

Comparison of Actual and Proportional Representation as Based on Popular Vote for Members of Illinois House of Representatives, 1940-52

Year	Party	Total Vote for Representatives	Percentage of Total Vote	Proportional Number	Number Elected
1940	Republican	5,837,953	50.1	77	79
	Democrat	5,817,080	49.9	76	74
1942	Republican	4,565,806	54.1	83	84
	Democrat	3,877,956	45.9	70	69
1944	Republican	5,594,380	50.05	77	79
	Democrat	5,575,769	49.9	76	74
	Independent	4,380	0.05	..	..
1946	Republican	5,719,200	56.6	87	88
	Democrat	4,382,078	43.3	66	65
	Independent	14,009	0.1	..	..
1948	Republican	5,400,876	47.7	73	72
	Democrat	5,711,105	51.5	79	81
	Progressive	88,863	0.8	1	..
1950	Republican	5,673,724	54.8	84	84
	Democrat	4,673,992	45.13	69	69
	Independent	4,164	0.04	..	..
	Progressive	2,929	0.03	..	..
1952	Republican	6,845,269	54.06	83	86
	Democrat	5,817,946	45.94	70	67

accurate reflection of relative party strength as evidenced in total popular votes cast for candidates for these offices. In this table, the actual number of representatives elected by each of the two major parties is compared with the proportional number that the party should have elected on the basis of the percentage of total votes cast by each party. The total deflection of the actual majority from the proportional majority in these seven sessions has been only 11 members, or an average of 1 and four-sevenths members per

session. The leading party has won only 1 seat more than it would have gained under a true proportional distribution of the seats in two sessions, 2 more seats in three sessions, and 3 more seats in one session. In the 1951 session, the actual and proportional numbers were the same.

This is a much more accurate reflection of party strengths than has resulted in the composition of the lower assemblies in the other selected states. Comparative information for the sessions of 1929, 1939, and 1949 in the five states is given in Table 4. With the 1949 session as the basis for comparison, this difference is convincingly evident. The actual split in the Illinois House was 81 to 72 in favor of the Democrats, while the proportional split would have been a 79 to 73 advantage for the Democrats, with 1 seat for the Progressives. In the other selected states, the actual and proportional splits would have been: from a 60 to 40 split in favor of the Democratic party to a 52 to 48 Democratic advantage in the Indiana House; from a 79 to 29 Republican advantage in Iowa to a 57 to 51 split in the Republicans' favor; in Michigan, the 61 to 39 Republican edge would have been a close 50.5 to a 49.5 division under proportional representation; and the 74 to 26 Republican advantage in Wisconsin would have been a 55 to 45 edge for the Republicans.

TABLE 4

Comparison of Actual Representation with Proportional Representation on the Basis of Popular Vote Cast for Office of State Treasurer in Selected Sessions of the Lower Legislative Chamber in Five States

Year	State	Actual House Strength			Proportional House Strength		
		Republican	Democrat	Other	Republican	Democrat	Other
1929	Illinois	91	62	..	88	65	..
	Indiana	80	20	..	56	44	..
	Iowa	95	13	..	72	36	..
	Michigan	98	2	..	72	28	..
	Wisconsin	89	5	6	70	25	5
1939	Illinois	79	74	..	77	76	..
	Indiana	51	49	..	50	50	..
	Iowa	89	19	..	58	50	..
	Michigan	73	27	..	51	49	..
	Wisconsin	53	15	32	48	17	35
1949	Illinois	72	81	..	73	79	1
	Indiana	40	60	..	48	52	..
	Iowa	79	29	..	57	51	..
	Michigan	61	39	..	50.5	49.5	..
	Wisconsin	74	26	..	55	45	..

With the strength of the leading party as the basis of comparison, the average deflection for the three sessions in the five states is as follows:

Illinois, 2 members; Indiana, 11 members; Wisconsin, 14.3 members; Michigan, 19.5 members; Iowa, 25.3 members.

### *Voter's Choice of Candidates*

The process of nominating candidates for election to the Illinois House of Representatives is an essential part of the system of cumulative voting. Since 1910, the power to set the quota of party nominees to be selected in the party primaries to stand in the general election has been entrusted to a party committee within each senatorial district.<sup>9</sup> These committees are known as senatorial district committees and are composed of three or more members, depending upon the number of counties comprising the district.

TABLE 5

Contests for Representative Seats in General Elections in Illinois 1920-52

Year	Number of Candidates		"Set-up" Districts	Districts Giving Voter Choice of	
	Republican	Democrat		3 of 4 Candidates	3 of 5 Candidates
1920	96	76	32	19	..
1922	100	82	23	27	1
1924	99	80	25	26	..
1926	96	75	33	18	..
1928	99	78	28	22	1
1930	99	77	30	19	2
1932	92	84	28	23	..
1934	89	92	23	28	..
1936	91	94	22	26	3
1938	89	88	27	24	..
1940	91	87	26	25	..
1942	92	88	24	27	..
1944	91	85	28	23	..
1946	95	83	26	25	..
1948	95	87	26	21	4
1950	93	88	24	26	1
1952	91	86	28	22	1
Totals	1,598	1,430	453	401	13

These party committees bear the brunt of much of the criticism leveled against the system of cumulative voting, with much of the dissatisfaction relating to the committees' exercise of the power to determine the quota of party nominees. The committees frequently underestimate the party's vote-getting strength and limit the party to one less nominee than it could elect on the basis of party votes cast. Occasionally they overestimate party strength and permit the nomination of one more nominee than the party

<sup>9</sup> *Illinois Laws, 1910, Special Session, 46-82.*

can actually elect. The result in the event of overestimation is that the party vote is divided among two or three candidates, and opposition parties that are stronger win all the representative seats or opposition parties that concentrate their votes on fewer candidates win more than their fair share of representation.

A far more frequent practice of these committees is to allow only three candidates altogether, thereby creating a "set-up" condition in the general election for the three primary-election winners. The extent to which this happens is shown in Table 5, which shows the number of general election contests for state representatives in each of the last seventeen elections.<sup>10</sup> This situation has occurred in 453 of the 867 (52 per cent) district elections since 1920. The average number of such "set-up" districts for this period was twenty-six and one-half districts per election, while the number in the last ten general elections has averaged twenty-five and two-fifths districts.

Similar information for the three selected general elections in the five states is shown in Table 6. There have been some uncontested seats in each

TABLE 6

Number of Major Party Candidates for State Representative Seats in Selected General Elections in Five States

Year	State	No. of Rep. Seats	Republican Candidates	Democrat Candidates	Other Candidates	Uncontested Seats
1928	Illinois	153	99	78	9	84
	Indiana	100	100	97	18	3
	Iowa	108	108	68	..	40
	Michigan	100	99	73	16	28
	Wisconsin	100	98	91	28	21
1938	Illinois	153	89	88	3	81
	Indiana	100	99	99	6	2
	Iowa	108	105	107	25	4
	Michigan	100	100	98	76	2
	Wisconsin	100	96	84	123	*
1948	Illinois	153	95	87	11	78
	Indiana	100	99	97	57	4
	Iowa	108	105	77	5	34
	Michigan	100	100	71	122	29
	Wisconsin	100	102	75	50	25

\* See n. 11.

<sup>10</sup> Table 5 gives these contests for the two major parties only, since no third party has been represented in the General Assembly during this period. The roster of members of the House of Representatives elected in 1922 shows one Independent. However, for all practical purposes this man was a Republican, since he served as a member of that party in the assemblies immediately preceding and immediately following the session of 1922.

state in each of these election years. Disregarding candidates of third parties except in the Wisconsin election of 1938, the number of uncontested elections can be readily computed in the four states other than Illinois.<sup>11</sup> For example, in the 1928 general election in Michigan, the Republicans failed to contest only 1 seat, offering 99 candidates for the 100 seats. The Democrats did not contest 27 seats, running a total of only 73 candidates for the 100 House seats. Thus, the total number of seats uncontested by one major party or the other was 28 in this Michigan election.

To get the total of uncontested seats in Illinois for these three elections, figures must be taken from Table 5. This table shows that there was no contest in twenty-eight districts in 1928, in twenty-seven districts in 1938, and in twenty-six districts in 1948. Since each district elects three representatives, the actual number of uncontested seats was 84, 81, and 78 for the three elections respectively.

Corresponding figures for Indiana were 3 in 1928, 2 in 1938, and 4 in 1948. In Iowa, the number of uncontested seats was 40, 4, and 34, respectively, for these three elections. The totals in Michigan were 28 in 1928, 2 in 1938, and 29 in 1949; the totals were 21 and 25, respectively, for the elections of 1928 and 1948 in Wisconsin. Comparative average percentages of uncontested elections for representative seats in these general elections are as follows: Illinois, 53 per cent; Indiana, 3 per cent; Iowa, 24 per cent; Michigan, 18 per cent; Wisconsin, 23 per cent. Thus, the percentage of such elections is significantly higher in Illinois than in any of the other four selected states, the ratio being 1 of every 2 seats in Illinois as compared to ratios of 1 of 4 in Iowa and Wisconsin, 1 of 5 in Michigan, and 1 of 33 in Indiana.

An earlier study shows that the voters in Illinois have a choice of candidates in primary elections on a par with the choice of primary electors in the other four selected states.<sup>12</sup> Thus, the lack of choice in the general election is not too serious, since such elections function imperfectly under any electoral system as a device for registering opinions concerning the relative merits of opposing candidates. The voter in Illinois also enjoys a moral choice even in "set-up" districts through his right to choose between cumulating his three votes for a single candidate or distributing them in equal or unequal parts between two or three candidates.

### *Conclusion*

Cumulative voting, adopted in Illinois in 1870 to achieve a fair representa-

<sup>11</sup> Third-party candidates cannot be disregarded in the 1938 election in Wisconsin since 32 of the 100 House seats were held by the Progressive party in the 1939 session.

<sup>12</sup> George S. Blair, "Cumulative Voting in Illinois" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, August, 1951), chapter v.

tion of the minority party in its lower legislative assembly, has proven to be an effective electoral device for accomplishing this purpose. The effectiveness is borne out: (1) in the small percentage (1.5 per cent) of district elections in which one party makes a sweep of the three representative seats as compared to the large number of district elections (98.5 per cent) in which the three seats are divided between the two major parties; (2) in the breakdown of the party composition in the assembly that shows that the minority party has been a real factor in each session since the adoption of cumulative voting; (3) in the accurate reflection of relative party strength, as evidenced in the total votes cast by each party, in the composition of the assembly.

In addition to achieving effective representation of the minority party, cumulative voting has also functioned to assure the Illinois House of Representatives other characteristics that are usually considered desirable in legislative assemblies. These features are: (1) the presence of a working majority for the leading party in the assembly; (2) the presence of experienced lawmakers in each session of the assembly; (3) the lack of cleavage between the leading legislative party and the party of the governor; (4) the absence of political landslides which thrust control of the assembly upon a group of inexperienced lawmakers.

# Moral Judgments in Social Science

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THE PROBLEM of the status of moral judgments in the social sciences is of considerable current interest and importance. Here I shall defend the view that there is a legitimate place for "moralizing" in social science. Discussion will center on two possible methodological approaches to social science that will be termed *factualism* and *moralism*, the goal of factualism being defined as the discovery of the laws of the subject matter under investigation, the goal of moralism as the construction of reliable moral judgments. The question to be examined is that of the appropriate place for each of these approaches in social science.

As an example of the distinction between the two approaches, consider two economists who adhere exclusively to factualism and moralism respectively. Both are concerned with examining the consequences of a certain monetary inflation. Up to a point, their investigations will be similar in the sense that each will attempt to formulate the laws governing the phenomenon in question. But the latter will not consider such an analysis sufficient: he will also pass judgment on the over-all goodness or badness of these consequences and make recommendations as to what extent if any the inflationary trend should be modified. The former would, of course, not necessarily wish to belittle the desirability of making generalized judgments of this kind; rather he would insist that there are compelling reasons for excluding that function from social science.

In distinguishing the factualistic approach from the moralistic I do not mean to imply that the adherent of the former believes he can proceed without reference to any valuational criteria whatever. Such an extreme factualism would indicate failure to understand even the factualistic method itself. Decisions as to the nature of facts, as to what constitutes valid arguments, as to what problems ought to be investigated must be faced in any inquiry, or at least, if not faced, assumptions about them are implicit in the inquiry. But if no approach can avoid certain basic normative assumptions, it is nevertheless possible to proceed, as the proponent of factualism would recommend, without making statements having any explicit implications for human decisions.

The factualist is one who for whatever reason would exclude from his

inquiry statements designed explicitly to serve as intelligent recommendations to perform some kind of act. If we call such recommendations moral judgments, we may then say that the factualist is opposed to the use of moral judgments in his inquiry. The moralist, on the other hand, attempts to reach *verifiable* conclusions designed to answer the question: "In this particular situation, what is the most desirable course of action?" and consequently he takes the position that verifiable statements having an especial significance for human choice can and should be made in the inquiries of the social scientist.

We may begin by considering what seem to me to be the three major arguments against the employment under any circumstances of the moralistic approach in social science. If, as I believe, it can be shown that these arguments are inadequate, the remaining question will concern the extent to which the moralistic approach should be employed in any given investigation. These three arguments are:

1. The social scientist is not an expert in moral matters; let the moral experts resolve moral questions.
2. In a democratic society each individual ought to make his own moral decisions based on the available facts; the social scientist can best serve democracy by helping to discover and make available significant and relevant facts.
3. Moral conclusions are necessarily "subjective" and "unverifiable"; the social scientist should limit his investigations to "scientifically verifiable" conclusions.

Of these arguments the third is doubtless the most important, and its repudiation will constitute the major burden of this paper. But the other two are sufficiently important to merit a brief discussion.

The first argument asserts that the social scientist should not use the moralistic approach because he is not qualified as an expert in moral matters. Now if there are no experts in moral matters the argument fails, since the social scientist would then be in as good a position as anyone else to make moral judgments; but I believe the argument is correct in its implicit assumption that experts do exist. Although one commonly hears it argued that there are no moral experts or that everyone is his own moral expert, I think that it can be shown rather easily that, in a nontrivial use of the word "expert," there are moral experts in at least three important senses. First, there are those people, usually philosophers, who concern themselves with the analysis and clarification of moral language and moral problems; they are surely useful persons to turn to for an insight into the question: "What do moral judgments mean?"<sup>1</sup> Second, anyone who has an unusual amount of

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps we learn from these experts chiefly the obscurity of the subject and the high degree of our ignorance of it. But this is surely useful information.

knowledge of, or acquaintance with, some field or fields of inquiry is *ipso facto* partially qualified as a moral expert in that area since reliable, concrete moral decisions depend on a knowledge of the facts involved in the particular situation. Third, there are those, usually philosophers or theologians, who have made it their especial task to compare and evaluate moral theories and, frequently, to develop moral theories of their own. It would be false to assert that we have among these people a body of experts who can give us answers to broad moral questions that are either in agreement or obviously "correct"; but it can be asserted that here is at least one fruitful place to turn for an insight into the "wisdom of the ages" that must be reckoned with in any adequate moral theory. One could of course argue that there are, in an important sense, no moral experts since even competent scholars cannot reach universal agreement on basic ethical principles. But this fact should not lead us to the erroneous conclusion that there are no experts in any sense whatever.

The factualist's first argument—the social scientist is not a moral expert; leave moralism to those who are—fails because he is himself numbered among those who have *one* of the qualifications for expertness: he has an intimate knowledge of the facts pertinent to practical moral problems. Furthermore, he can attempt to become conversant with the thoughts and opinions of those two other groups that we have termed expert. And it is no criticism of his expertness that he cannot prove to every reasonable person's satisfaction the validity of his basic moral principles, for no man has succeeded in doing that. Each of the three species of moral experts enumerated can make its own uniquely valuable recommendations on practical moral issues. For each, though it will want to be as conversant as possible with the others, will of necessity through limitations of time, energy, and ability be best qualified in one area, hence best able to do justice to that aspect in the total picture. The analogy in which each phase of the inquiry might be pictured after the manner of a stage in a production line is inadequate because of the character of the subject matter involved. For two reasons, the social scientist cannot ordinarily simply present all of the "relevant" facts for synthesis by someone else. There is, first, the consideration that in a complex inquiry the relevant facts are themselves open to question: *which* facts are important enough to be brought to the moralist's attention? Surely it is an impossible task to correlate all of the facts that *might* be relevant. Further, it is doubtful that the method by which the moral expert lays down criteria of relevance for the factualist to follow is in general adequate; what is relevant is frequently determined or modified in the course of the investigation itself, and not prior to that investigation. Second, the formulated conclusions of a complex inquiry in the social sciences seldom represent the exact position of the inquirer. There is the obvious but important difficulty re-

sulting from vagueness and ambiguity in the use of language; especially worth noting in this regard is the difficulty of representing in words the exact emphases that the inquirer has in mind. Equally significant is the impossibility of presenting in a manageable form, in a complex inquiry, all of the relevant material. Factors known to the inquirer but not presented in his formal position could influence his moral judgments but would not be available to influence the judgments of the outsider. Thus for the reasons enumerated, the factual inquirer himself is in a unique position to make reliable practical moral judgments. He is *in some respects* the best possible expert on practical moral problems.<sup>2</sup>

Turning to the second argument, is it not a fundamental conception of a democratic society that important moral decisions are to be resolved independently by each individual citizen? And does it not seem inconsistent with this conception that social scientists who in general are paid public servants—and who are more than ordinarily influential—should do more than provide the factual information necessary for making intelligent, independent decisions? The central idea of the argument is not that each citizen should be free (physically uncoerced) in his decision-making, for this could be the case even with a moralistic social science; rather it is the conception that he should make, and be encouraged to make, his own appraisals in as many areas as possible but especially at the highest levels of public policy. Basic public policy in a democracy should emanate from the thoughtful, independently-arrived-at conclusions of the people themselves. And one obvious way of implementing this goal would be for those who have the especial function of providing the factual material relevant to public problems to withhold their own moral convictions.

In evaluating this argument it should be observed that the implementation of thoughtful, independent judgment is only one end of any society. The need for a certain amount of efficiency, for example, as well as several other aims, means that frequently there will be a conflict of ends; thus, in any given situation, it might be more desirable for the social scientist to function as moralist even though that would to some extent conflict with the aim of democracy as described. Particularly, in view of the conclusion reached earlier concerning experts that the social scientist is in some respects in a peculiarly good position for making reliable moral judgments, there would always be the question: Which is more worthwhile in this case, the suppression of one of the best sources of reliable judgments, or the en-

<sup>2</sup> What is said here is meant to apply primarily to large, complex inquiries. Field workers who merely collect data *in accordance with a prescribed method* are in no better position to generalize about their findings than anyone else. But note the dangerous assumption that the prescribed method is being adhered to rigidly. Only the field worker himself can adequately attest to this. One wonders, for example, what some census takers might say concerning the reliability of population statistics.

couragement of thoughtful, independent judgment among the public? But it is likely that there is, by and large, no genuine antithesis between the social scientist functioning as moralist and the encouragement of independent thinking; the reverse is more probably true. Nothing is so likely to discourage inquiry on the part of the average time-limited citizen as a vast body of unsynthesized material obviously requiring years of effort and investigation. On the other hand, one of the most effective ways of stimulating investigation (as the classroom teacher is well aware) is the presentation of conflicting recommendations and theories concerning important public problems. If it were possible to present completely neutral relevant information to the public, and if that information were clear enough and limited enough so that any thoughtful person could synthesize it within the limits of his available time, and if the public on the average could be significantly labeled "thoughtful," there would be a substantial defense for the argument under consideration. But each of the assumptions upon which the argument depends is either doubtful or clearly false.

Perhaps it may be felt that the very making of moral judgments is somehow dogmatic and dictatorial, but a clearer understanding of the nature of moral judgments should correct this impression. One may, of course, speak as if his moral recommendations are absolute commands beyond all question, but one may also speak as if his conclusions are hypotheses submitted humbly to the court of reason. There is no single function served by moral judgments, and no single thing that they may all as a body be said to mean. But they *can* serve very fruitful functions if they are judiciously used in the interest of stimulating independent thought and encouraging understanding as well as recommending what are believed to be desirable courses of action. The spirit in which moral judgments are made need not be antidemocratic.

Implicit throughout our discussion of the first two arguments has been the assumption that *reliable* moral judgments are possible. If this be granted, it hardly needs arguing that those who are in a position to make reliable moral judgments ought to do so, for by definition reliable moral judgments are the basis of all intelligent action. And we should probably all agree that we do want to act intelligently. That reliable moral judgments are possible is assumed by anyone who believes that there are better and worse ways of acting or that it pays to deliberate upon one's decisions. In practice, everyone does make this assumption; thus the theoretical issue concerning its justification need not concern us here. But it is a matter of great dispute as to what constitutes a reliable moral judgment and as to what is the criterion for testing reliability. Particularly important is the problem involved in the conflict of human interests: is there necessarily a just solution for such a conflict when one or both parties involved would have to make sacrifices if the conflict is to be eliminated? Now important as these problems are—and each human

being necessarily must come to grips with them if only in a nonreflective, attitudinal way—I believe that the value of employing moral judgments in social science can be demonstrated practically<sup>3</sup> without a consideration of these problems. This demonstration, if successful, will provide a sufficient answer to the major objection to moralizing in the social sciences referred to earlier, namely, that moral judgments are subjective or unverifiable.

To accept the moral recommendation of another *simply* because it is a recommendation stated in moral terms, though perhaps not uncommon, would be an unintelligent mode of action. Nor would an intelligent person ask the advice of another unless he thought the latter was in at least as good a position as himself to make a reliable judgment.<sup>4</sup> Some of the qualities making for expertness have already been considered; what remains to be pointed out is that, since we all do at any given time have a basic moral viewpoint which guides our actions, we turn to those whom we believe to be in fundamental moral agreement with ourselves as well as expert in other ways for the answer to problems that call for specific ways of acting. When I ask another what I ought to do, I expect him to be morally like myself or like what I would wish ideally to be. This is not meant to imply that one is always clear about his own fundamental moral position or about that of the person to whom he turns for advice but only that he has information that he takes as evidence of like-mindedness. Thus for ordinary practical decisions, as opposed to decisions concerning the very fundamentals of our moral positions, we take like-mindedness to be one qualification for expertness. To find out what to do in a specific situation here and now I turn to those who are like-minded; to find out what ought to be done in general—what is the good life—I may with equal profit turn to those who are not at all similar in moral attitude. Here we have a ground for distinguishing the approaches of the moral theorist and the moralistic social scientist not generically but in degree of emphasis. The former concentrates upon entertaining and explicating clearly and precisely general moral principles, leaving largely implicit the question of application to concrete problems; the latter, operating from largely implicit moral assumptions, attempts to formulate reliable recommendations for practical problems.

Ideally, it would be better if both functions could be performed simultaneously, but the division of labor has its practical advantages in many instances. Nothing could be more absurd—from the standpoint of getting things done—than to ask for, or insist upon, a complete statement of one's

<sup>3</sup> To demonstrate it theoretically I would have to justify the values to which I appeal; but what I here call a practical demonstration is simply a reliance upon the acceptance of my argument on the basis of the widespread acceptance of the values to which I appeal.

<sup>4</sup> I neglect irrelevant motives such as asking advice in order to flatter or because one wants to please another by acting in the way the other recommends.

moral position every time he made a moral recommendation. Even to ask for such a statement from every social scientist, say once in his lifetime, though not without its advantages, is usually unnecessary and undesirable. For there is a greater amount of moral agreement than is sometimes supposed, and barring specific allegations to the contrary, one properly assumes that the moral viewpoint of the investigator is the one implicit in the society from which he speaks. One properly assumes, for example—in lieu of a specific disclaimer—that an investigator in the U.S.A. of 1954 takes as the moral foundations of his inquiry such goals as universal education, equal rights before the law, a privately, not publicly, controlled press, or in general that it is the public interest as usually interpreted, and not some special interest, which guides his inquiry. The point should not be pushed too hard, for it is only within very vague limits that there is general agreement on each of the goals mentioned or on any other that might be mentioned. And there is surely no end of confusion resulting from apparent like-mindedness that is not in fact real. Without doubt, the system of moralizing from implicit assumptions has its difficulties, and when the inquirer senses a probable misunderstanding he should try to make his goal explicit. But it is simply not possible to do everything thoroughly; one can develop and present his own basic moral position only at great length and after long effort. A balance needs to be maintained between eliminating vagueness and misunderstanding on the one hand and getting things done on the other, the best balance depending on factors such as the urgency of the problem, its complexity, etc.

In short, I am suggesting that moral judgments in the social sciences can function as ellipses or summary statements for inquiries so complex that a complete explication of the factors involved would be seldom, if ever, possible, but, even if possible, not ordinarily desirable. Their justification rests on the fact that they promote economy in inquiry by making only an implicit appeal to the common body of moral assumptions that underlies any organized society. The social inquirer need not be chained to the morality implicit in the society in which he operates, but to the extent to which he diverges, it is incumbent upon him to make that divergence clear and explicit. The inquirer who deviates from the social norm provides reliable advice for his fellow deviates; but here his role is to a greater extent that of a moral theorist inviting the predominant opposition to re-examine its basic moral assumptions.

Valuable as the function of giving advice to the like-minded may be, it will be insufficient for any complex inquiry. Inconsistencies in the common body of moral opinion may become apparent, and problems will arise that have no solution in terms of the common body of moral opinion. In other words, a point is reached where decisions must be made that *cannot* be based simply on the common moral opinion. For this reason we have a second pos-

sible moralistic function of the social scientist. If reliable moral judgments in cases of this kind *can* be made, the social scientist would be justified in making them because of his intimate knowledge of the facts involved. But some reason must be adduced for considering such judgments reliable other than that the social scientist has a good grasp of the relevant facts. Situations of this kind call for an appraisal of the common body of moral opinion in the effort to distinguish what is genuinely valued from what is valued only accidentally or incidentally, and the application of these findings to the particular problem under investigation. The question involved here is not so much "What *ought to be* the common body of moral opinion?" as "What *would be* the common body of moral opinion if the public had access to the relevant facts and the opportunity to consolidate its position freely and reflectively?" Uncertain and tentative as such appraisals must be, it nevertheless seems clear enough that their status need not be that of mere guesswork, and that the practical judgments based on them can be most useful for persons who do not have sufficient time or training to make their own critical evaluations. In performing this complicated function, the social scientist, though approaching more closely the area of "purely ethical" problems, is still, essentially, giving advice to the like-minded, for he is not imposing his own standards but attempting to determine what the common body of moral opinion would have decreed if it had had the opportunity to become consolidated. I think it unlikely that moral judgments having any specific content, and designed to apply universally to all persons at all times—whatever functions they may serve—can be said to be "reliable" (or "unreliable") in any significant sense. But reliability becomes intelligible when conceived in terms of a common background of ethical attitudes.

If like-mindedness is the essential prerequisite for making reliable practical moral recommendations, this fact definitely delimits the employment of such recommendations. When two groups are in basic ethical conflict, no single comprehensive recommendation can be directed to both of them; what will be a reliable recommendation for one of them will not be for the other. But even in cases of this sort, limited recommendations—valid for both groups—usually can be made since we know of no groups having altogether opposed attitudes.\* And within a society certain subgroups will have special interests that they do not wish to subordinate to the general welfare. But they will be well aware that moral recommendations are designed not to reflect their special interests but the interests of society as a co-ordinated whole.

I conclude, therefore, that the social scientist is in a peculiarly good posi-

\* The problem of basic ethical conflict is dealt with in more detail in my article "The Role of the Social Scientist," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, XXXII, No. 4 (March, 1952), 271-76.

tion to perform at least two highly valuable ethical functions:<sup>6</sup> (1) Where the common body of ethical opinion is consolidated, free from contradiction, comprehensive and clear enough, the social scientist can deduce from that common body of opinion, together with the relevant facts, practical recommendations for action in concrete situations acceptable to most persons. (2) Where the common body of ethical opinion does not permit obvious deductions—and it never does wholly but only in varying degree—the social scientist can nevertheless by virtue of his expert status make recommendations which fundamentally like-minded persons will want to consider seriously.

We have seen that the usual objections to the moralistic approach appear to be ill-founded if construed as blanket objections to the practice of moralism in the social sciences anywhere at anytime. If this conclusion is accepted, the methodological problem of the social scientist would concern not the desirability of the moralistic approach as such but the extent to which that approach should be used in any given situation. The view of the extreme moralist that *every* inquiry should eventuate in specifically moral conclusions also appears false. The degree to which the moralistic approach is employed should depend on the nature and purpose of the inquiry and the kind of group for whom the inquiry is conducted. Without developing this topic in detail, what I have in mind may be illustrated by reference to so-called "popular" and "technical" literature. One does not ordinarily write the same book for the public that he writes for his colleagues, and though the same moral conclusions may appear in both, it is rather more common to draw moral conclusions in the former than in the latter. In many instances there is obvious justification for this difference in procedure: those familiar with the area under investigation are in a good position to synthesize the material for themselves; those on the outside probably are not. Further, the aim of increasing and consolidating the facts in a specialized field of inquiry without drawing moral conclusions (other than that the facts have relevance and significance) is a legitimate one *if it may be assumed* that some person or persons having expert status will synthesize them morally. But perhaps this assumption is too readily made, as is the assumption, among those who do synthesize morally for themselves and their colleagues, that "someone" will do it for the public. Probably "someone" will do it indeed, but will he be as genuinely qualified as those who typically forego the task?

<sup>6</sup> I do not mean to suggest that the functions described are necessarily the only ones that moralizing in the social sciences can profitably serve, but I believe them to be sufficiently important to justify the moralistic approach.

# The 1951 New York Wildcat Dock Strike: Some Consequences Of Union Structure for Management-Labor Relations

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

THE PROBLEM with which this paper is concerned is the effect of the structure of a labor union upon management-labor relations. The industrial system that has been chosen for study is the longshore industry in the Port of New York. Since the system is highly complex, the attempt of this paper is to provide a framework within which the system may be understood rather than to present the complete picture.

The existence of the longshore industry is due to the fact that the waterfront constitutes a transportation break and therefore necessitates a loading and unloading process. A social system is necessary to perform this function.

The longshore industry as a social system contains individuals who have specialized in the roles of manager, customer, and worker. Upon the basis of these occupational roles, they have organized groups that constitute subsystems within the larger industrial system. The roles connected with the movement of commodities between ship and pier are filled by the stevedoring and shipping companies as managers, the importers and exporters as customers, and the longshoremen as workers. The stevedoring and shipping companies are organized into the New York Shipping Association. The importers and exporters are organized into the Commerce and Industry Association. The longshoremen are organized into the International Longshoremen's Association, the labor union for longshoremen in New York and on the Atlantic Coast.

The conditions within which this industrial system operates are characterized by oversupply of labor, fluctuating demand for labor, high hourly wages, low annual income, easily replaceable labor force, and hazardous working conditions. Shore labor-costs comprise a relatively high proportion of the shipping costs.

With reference to these conditions, the International Longshoremen's

Association performs three functions: it allocates job opportunities among its members, maintains an oversupply of labor, and attempts to reduce strikes. They will be discussed in that order.

The ILA allocates job opportunities through the practice called the "shape-up." In the shape-up, union members assemble at the pier entrances on workdays at 7:55 A.M. and the hiring boss picks the men that he needs for work. The ILA at present controls the shape-up by being able to choose the hiring boss even though the New York Shipping Association claims this right. Informally, the New York Shipping Association has delegated the function of allocating job opportunities to the ILA in return for the ILA's maintenance of an oversupply of labor and reduction of strikes.

The ILA contributes to the oversupply of labor through failure to restrict membership in accordance with the demand for longshoremen. It does not close the books as some other unions do when there is a reduced demand for labor.

The evidence for the ILA's role in the reduction of strikes is of two types: (1) The stevedoring and shipping companies have paid various union officials to keep work stoppages at a minimum.<sup>1</sup> (2) For about thirty years after the first collective agreement in 1916 between the ILA and the employers of the Port of New York, there were no major strikes.<sup>2</sup> From 1945 through 1951, more than twelve wildcat strikes took place, and the major longshore strikes in New York that occurred in 1945, 1948, and 1951 were unauthorized by the leaders of the ILA, though in 1945 and 1948 they eventually supported the strikes. The 1951 strike was the only major wildcat strike that the leaders did not eventually support and it lasted longer than any previous longshore strike in the Port of New York.

The effect of the structure of the International Longshoremen's Association upon its relations with the New York Shipping Association will be shown by the analysis of a particular act, the October–November 1951 wildcat dock strike in the Port of New York.

The events leading up to and during the strike are as follows. The ILA and the New York Shipping Association concluded negotiations on October 8, 1951. Two days later a special edition of *Longshore News* announced contract changes and the date of balloting. The very next day, balloting was held and the contract approved. The vote was 6,552 for, and 3,331 against the contract,<sup>3</sup> out of some 40,000 ILA members in New York.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *New York Times*, December 4, 5, 9, 16, 1952, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> New York State Department of Labor, Martin P. Catherwood, John P. Boland, and Dean Alfange, *Final Report to the Industrial Commissioner, State of New York, from Board of Inquiry on Longshore Industry Work Stoppage, October–November, 1951, Port of New York* (New York, 1952), 31.

<sup>3</sup> *New York Times*, November 6, 1951, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, October 28, 1951, Sec. 4, p. 1.

The walkout started on October 15 when about a thousand men from Locals 791, 808, 968, and 1124 failed to shape-up. Joseph Ryan, president of the ILA, and some local leaders and dock bosses attempted to get the men back to work, but the strike spread to other locals and piers. On October 18, Gene Sampson, "insurgent leader," business agent of Local 791 and rival of Ryan, announced that he would take over the leadership of the Strike Committee. The Strike Committee questioned the ratification vote on the contract and the selection of the negotiation committee and therefore demanded a new contract. They spread the strike by means of car caravans and blockage of pier entrances. By October 30, the entire port was tied up.

On November 2, after other groups had tried but failed to end the strike, a state board of inquiry was named and by November 9 they had persuaded the Strike Committee to end the strike. The Board found that the time allowed and the method of notifying the members about the contract had been insufficient. However, they recommended that the contract be recognized; although there had been fraud and ballot-box stuffing in some locals, the total number of fraudulent ballots was not enough to change the result of the vote on ratification.<sup>5</sup>

It will now be shown how the wildcat strike occurred because of the structure of the International Longshoremen's Association.

A wildcat strike, if treated as the result of rational calculation of means to ends, is used in three ways. First, it can be a means by which union leaders may gain their personal and union ends without the responsibility of formally calling a strike. However, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that Ryan, leader of the ILA, started the wildcat strike in order to avoid that responsibility. Second, it can be a means by which individuals and groups outside the system may gain control of the union. The individuals and groups that were named during the 1951 strike as possible aspirants to control of ILA are the Congress of Industrial Organizations, Harry Bridges, the Communist party, the Xavier Labor School, and the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists. Third, a wildcat strike can be a means by which individuals and groups within the system may gain control of the union. Gene Sampson and the anti-Ryan faction have been named in this category.

One group outside the system to which the strike may be attributed is the Congress of Industrial Organizations. Various CIO unions have in the past gone on sympathy strikes and have tried to help the rank-and-file ILA revolts.<sup>6</sup> Ryan has in the past instructed ILA members to cross CIO picket lines.<sup>7</sup> The strikers in the 1951 wildcat strike were receiving aid from a number of CIO affiliates—the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association and

<sup>5</sup> Catherwood *et al.*, *Final Report to the Industrial Commissioner*, 7-8.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, October 24, 1951, p. 1.

<sup>7</sup> "Strikes," *LABOR, Facts on File*, September 17, 1946, p. 302.

the United Brewery Workers.<sup>8</sup> There is, however, no evidence that actual origination of strike action was due to any CIO intervention. The CIO support was given after the strike was under way.

Harry Bridges, leader of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, was in New York at the time of the 1951 wildcat strike. He admitted being in sympathy with the strikers, at the same time denying influence in the strike. Bridges is a rival for Ryan's power<sup>9</sup> because he took the West Coast longshoremen away from Ryan in 1937<sup>10</sup> and because Ryan has participated in AFL drives to rid the West Coast of Communist-dominated unions (Harry Bridges and the ILWU).<sup>11</sup> There is, however, no evidence to indicate any origination of strike action by Harry Bridges, although he may have had reason to do so.

The most outspoken advocate of the hypothesis that the strike was Communist-inspired was Ryan himself. However, Communist influence in the strike was denied by the strikers, Harry Bridges, the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, the Xavier Labor School, and the New York State Board of Inquiry. As further evidence of the absence of Communist domination on the New York water-front, there have been repeated refusals of the longshoremen to load or unload cargo coming from or going to Russian or satellite ports. The only evidence for Communist activity in the strike was in the form of leaflets, from sources apparently Communist or sympathetic to Communists, distributed on the Brooklyn water-front. Although the Communist party may have wanted to help the strikers and although the strike may have served their ends by slowing down supplies for Korea, this particular strike cannot be attributed to Communist activity.

Two other outside organizations that have been mentioned in connection with the strike are the Xavier Labor School and the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists. They have both attempted to introduce into the water-front situation such reforms as greater safeguards in balloting and the establishment of a hiring hall. In 1950, the Xavier Labor School had been instrumental in getting an ex-convict defeated in Local 791 and it gave aid to the strikers during the 1951 strike.<sup>12</sup> That there was a close connection between the Strike Committee and the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists is indicated by the fact that the Strike Committee's recommendations submitted to the Board of Inquiry on December 20, 1951,<sup>13</sup> contain, word for word, eleven of the ACTU's recommendations on labor and water-front conditions

<sup>8</sup> *New York Times*, November 5, 1951, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Malcolm Johnson, *Crime on the Labor Front* (New York, 1950), 156.

<sup>10</sup> Willard Shelton, "Waterfront Revolt," *New Republic*, 117 (July 14, 1947), 33.

<sup>11</sup> *LABOR, Facts on File*, September 21, 22, 1951, p. 309.

<sup>12</sup> Lester Velie, "A Waterfront Priest Battles the Big Port's Big Boss," *Collier's*, 129 (February 16, 1952), 58.

<sup>13</sup> Catherwood et al., *Final Report to the Industrial Commissioner*, 79-85.

that appeared in the ACTU newspaper on December 15.<sup>14</sup> However, there is no evidence to support the theory that either of these organizations started the strike even though they did side with the strikers and give them aid.

The individuals and groups within the system that could have rationally used the wildcat strike are Gene Sampson, the Strike Committee, and the anti-Ryan faction. Gene Sampson was business manager of Local 791, a local that has since 1945 led in using the wildcat strike as a means of protesting Ryan's contracts with the New York Shipping Association. He has been named as an important rival of Ryan and as leader of the anti-Ryan faction within the ILA. In the 1951 strike, he assumed nominal leadership of the Strike Committee after the strike was under way, but had had no part in the original walkout.<sup>15</sup> The Strike Committee was important for the execution of the strike, but it did not emerge until the strike was under way. The anti-Ryan faction of which Sampson is a member is unorganized. It is composed of those ILA members who would like to see other leaders replace Ryan and his adherents. The origin of the strike cannot, therefore, be regarded as the planned attempt of the anti-Ryan faction to reopen the contract and gain control of the union. Nevertheless, those involved in the origin of the strike were in the anti-Ryan faction, and there were undoubtedly groups within the faction that did use the strike to try to reopen the contract. The early strike action was actually sporadic and was not directed from any one source, though informal leaders and local officials seem to have been the sources from which the action started.<sup>16</sup>

Examination of the theories concerning the rational use of the strike has revealed (1) certain groups within the system involved in the origin of the strike and (2) certain groups both within and outside of the system that participated in the execution of the strike. The groups within the system involved in the origination of the strike were certain informal leaders and local officials. The groups concerned with the execution of the strike were Sampson and the Strike Committee within the system, and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, and the Xavier Labor School outside the system.

Does the naming of the groups that initiated the strike action and contributed to the continuation of this action constitute an adequate explanation of the strike? Is there not required a further explanation of how these groups could contribute as they did to the strike?

The hypotheses proposed so far are inadequate to explain: (1) how the strike could have been started by members of the anti-Ryan faction; (2) how

<sup>14</sup> *Labor Leader*, December 15, 1951, p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Letter to the writer from James McElroy, executive secretary of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, May 1, 1952.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

the Strike Committee could have emerged and successfully spread the strike by means of car caravans and blockage of pier entrances; (3) how outside organizations could have given aid to one segment of the union; (4) how these actions could have occurred in opposition to the interests and efforts of the top ILA officials and many local leaders and dock bosses.

The most logical hypothesis that will answer the preceding questions involves the structure of the International Longshoremen's Association. This structure is weak, thereby allowing a divergence between power and authority.<sup>17</sup> The absence of correspondence between the structure of power and that of authority<sup>18</sup> in the ILA made possible three conditions necessary for the origin of the strike.

If the strike is treated as the result of rational calculation of means to ends, the elements necessary for it to occur are: (1) groups within the system that can carry out the strike action; (2) certain goals held by these groups; (3) the type of situation in which the strike can be used as a means to these goals. These conditions were brought about by the divergent power and authority structures in the ILA.

When power and authority diverge, the structure of authority is weakened and the means by which individuals and groups accumulate power is left uncontrolled. This situation permitted the rise of groups and individuals within the ILA that did not have authority for certain acts, but that did have the power to act in unauthorized ways without being punished by any ILA officials. For example, particular individuals were able to appoint themselves to the Wage Scale Conference and to personally appropriate union funds. Certain groups were able to gain enough power so that they could defy the leaders of the ILA through work stoppages and get away with it.

<sup>17</sup> The concepts of authority and power as used here are defined in *The Changing Culture of a Factory* by Elliot Jaques (London, 1951), 254-55: "The authority attached to a given position in the firm is the statement of what any person (or body) occupying that position can do, whom he can instruct, what equipment he can use, and what he can authorize to be done. In short, the authority system of a community is a formal structure which defines and regulates the means and directions in which individuals or bodies may exert power. In contrast to authority as an attribute of a position, power is an attribute of an individual or group; the term defines the strength or intensity of influence that a given body or individual is potentially capable of exerting at any given time, regardless either of the role assumed or the authority carried."

<sup>18</sup> In the concrete structure of the International Longshoremen's Association, it is possible to differentiate on an analytical level between power and authority structures. The distinction between concrete and analytical structures is that made in *The Structure of Society* by Marion J. Levy, Jr., (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1952), 88, 89: "The distinction between concrete and analytic structure is oriented to the type of abstraction involved in certain concepts useful for empirical analysis. Concrete structures are defined as those patterns that define the character of units that are at least in theory capable of physical separation (in time and/or space) from other units of the same sort." "Analytic structures are defined as patterned aspects of action that are not even theoretically capable of concrete separation from other patterned aspects of action."

The structure of authority, through which groups and individuals in most organizations perform their functions, was weak and ineffective in the ILA. Groups within the structure tended to disregard the channels of authority in favor of gaining their ends through the application of power in illegitimate, nonchanneled ways. The presence of ex-convicts in positions of leadership and the use of force as a means were therefore common. Since the authority structure was weak, groups within the system lacked the protection that would have been provided by a structure able to regulate the accumulation of power. Power, therefore, had to become an end in itself if any particular group within the system was to survive.

Since the structure provided the groups (factions within the system struggling with each other and with the leadership) and the ends (accumulation of power per se), the wildcat strike as one possible means to power becomes understandable. Being illegitimate, it placed least reliance on authority and depended instead on strength and the ability to influence. The method was rational, since acting through channels of authority and using parliamentary means to reduce the power of the ILA leaders probably would not have worked. (Ryan is president of the ILA for life.) An unauthorized means was therefore more likely to reduce the power of the ILA leaders. This was because the wildcat strike could force the reopening of the contract and also bring on public investigations that might discredit the leaders of the ILA.

The top ILA officials had both the authority and the power to negotiate and make contracts with the New York Shipping Association, but they did not have the power to gain sufficient acceptance of the contract on the part of the rank-and-file to keep the piers in operation. Ryan and his followers had in some cases the power to get the men back to work, but they were not effective in stopping the spread of the strike. For instance, on October 17, Anthony Anastasia (hiring boss at Erie Basin piers, with no official status in the union) arrived at the army base with seventy-five to a hundred men to stop the strike. When he started to send his own men onto the pier, the strikers went back to work. At noon, however, they walked out again.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, members of the anti-Ryan faction had no authority for starting a strike, but they did have the power to do so, and the Strike Committee had the power to block pier entrances and prolong the strike. It was in this type of situation that outside groups were able to give aid to the Strike Committee with little probability that the leadership of the ILA would punish them.

Although the strike has so far been treated as a rationally calculated act, there were probably nonrational elements involved. The refusal to shape-up, besides having a rationally planned aspect, also has some of the characteristics

<sup>19</sup> *New York Times*, October 18, 1951, p. 1.

of a protest, not calculated as a means to further ends. This type of non-rational "protest" action is perhaps more likely to occur when power is not commensurate with authority, since the unauthorized action is more apt to go unpunished by the leaders.

After explaining the origin and execution of the strike as a result of the divergence between power and authority structures, there remains the problem of how the concrete structure of the ILA could be so weak as to allow this divergence. The structural weakness derives from (1) the method of job distribution; (2) the lack of specificity and formalized rules governing union affairs.

The method of job distribution (the shape-up) and the monopoly of job opportunities are the source of the ILA's power. The ILA controls the shape-up by having the power to choose the hiring boss who in turn has the power to select the men that he needs for work on the basis of particularistic criteria. These criteria include friendship; political affiliation; extortion; kickbacks; patronage of certain gamblers, loansharks, and businesses; participation in theft and smuggling within the industry; votes in both ILA and political elections; membership in certain organizations; ethnic and racial background; *droit du seigneur* (exchange of sexual privileges with a longshoreman's wife or daughter in return for a job).<sup>20</sup> This method of job distribution establishes many little power centers over which the directors of the union try to maintain control, each hiring boss being a potential rival for the leadership of the ILA. Therefore, the leaders of the ILA tend to allow the hiring bosses freedom in their methods of hiring in return for controlling the labor force and maintaining the leaders in power. There is a system for recruiting ex-convicts to perform these functions.<sup>21</sup>

The absence of specificity and formalized rules and the failure to adhere to union rules extend into many spheres of union affairs with the result that power is diffuse and not regularized in many locals through such devices as annual financial reports. The Board of Inquiry found situations in which locals failed to hold periodic elections and meetings, to have bank accounts and keep financial and other records, to have financial affairs audited and to bond officers handling funds of locals. In some cases, delegates to the Wage Scale Conference were self-appointed instead of being elected as required by the constitution of the ILA. Voting procedure was also characterized by lack of formality. Situations existed in which no record was kept of those who voted, unnumbered ballots were used and results were telephoned into headquarters without subsequent verification. In some locals,

<sup>20</sup> Maurice Rosenblatt, "The Scandal of the Waterfront," *Nation*, 161 (November 17, 1945), 516.

<sup>21</sup> *New York Times*, December 5, 1952, pp. 1, 30, 31.

ballots were handed out without the demand to see the union dues-book and no permanent record of balloting was kept.<sup>22</sup>

There is probably a relationship between the lack of specificity governing union affairs and the lack of specificity in the work situation. The fluctuating demand for labor caused by uncertainty as to arrival of ships introduces an element of diffuseness into the work situation. Since the method of spreading the news concerning ship arrivals tends to be informal, the diffuseness is increased. However, the persons who have access to information are able to organize the diffuse situation in their own terms and to demand personal loyalty from people to whom they give information. The dock boss and the local leader are in a position in which they can use their information about ship arrivals as well as their control of job opportunities to increase their power. Uncertainty as to ship arrivals is greatest with deep-water traffic, whereas with local and coastal arrivals, some certainty has been achieved and regular gangs have been formed. However, it is not known whether those locals that have the greatest structural specificity in the form of regular meetings and elections are those that have the greatest specificity in the work situation, since their members work local and coastal vessels and are in steady gangs.

Failure to limit membership is part of the same lack of specificity and is indicative of certain structural features of the ILA not possessed by many other labor unions. Assuming that the goal of the local leader in both the ILA and in other unions is maintenance in office, why do the means of attaining this goal differ? The local leader in the ILA stays in office by allowing unrestricted membership, whereas the leader in other types of unions maintains his position by restricting the membership of the union to the demand for labor. Unlimited membership in the ILA means a greater market for the dock boss and the local leader, whereas restriction of membership in other unions means greater bargaining power for the union. In the ILA, the dock boss personally appropriates and exploits the income opportunities inherent in his position. This position entails allocation of job opportunities over which he has a monopoly in his particular jurisdiction. The market for these jobs consists of the labor force that appears at each shape-up. Any attempt to restrict the market for job opportunities by restriction of membership or calling a strike would be irrational from an economic point of view. This is because job opportunities are exchanged for money, power, and the particularistic considerations previously mentioned.

What kinds of structures are represented in the ILA and the normal type of union? In a normal case where the union restricts membership, there is not so great a chance for an individual personally to appropriate the income op-

<sup>22</sup> Catherwood *et al.*, *Final Report to the Industrial Commissioner*, 20-21.

portunities inherent in his office, since his power is controlled and channeled, his rights and duties being specific. If a person in this type of union did try personally to appropriate income opportunities, he would probably lose power and authority through defeat in election for office, or through dismissal, demotion, or some other penalty administered by his superior for infraction of the rules of the organization. The union man in this situation is in a bureaucratic structure.

In the International Longshoremen's Association, since power is diffuse and rights and duties are not specific, an individual is able to appropriate personally the income opportunities connected with his office, and, in fact, his maintenance in office depends upon his doing this. The person in the ILA type of union is in a feudalistic structure. This type of structure entails appropriation of powers and rights of exercising authority in return for services rendered, and there is a reciprocal relationship between the co-ordinating authority and the smaller powers. However, the power of the co-ordinating authority is in great part dependent upon the personal loyalty of the smaller powers and there is a continuous struggle for power within the whole system.<sup>23</sup>

A bureaucratic structure is, on the other hand, characterized by discipline and a hierarchical arrangement of offices and authority in which rights and duties are specific and in which administrative acts are recorded in writing. In this type of structure, there is a complete absence of appropriation of his official position by the incumbent and the office is treated as his primary occupation.<sup>24</sup> In the ILA, there was a minimum of record keeping. Union office was treated as one of several offices. Instances occurred in which union organizers were presidents of locals and operators of loading businesses at the same time, so that the same man was the union representative and employer of labor.<sup>25</sup> He would also manage, or have interests in, loan companies, gambling, grocery stores, barber shops, organized theft, smuggling, and other enterprises, the support of which was made criteria in the selection of workers.

Analysis of the wildcat strike has revealed a divergence of authority and power within the structure of the ILA that was found to contain feudalistic, as contrasted with bureaucratic, elements. This structure affected the ILA's relationship with the New York Shipping Association in at least two important respects—the inability of the union leaders to gain acceptance of the contract on the part of the rank-and-file, and also the need of the stevedoring and shipping companies to use cash payments to the leaders of various

<sup>23</sup> Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York, Oxford University Press, 1947), 335, 373–81.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 330–34.

<sup>25</sup> Catherwood *et al.*, *Final Report to the Industrial Commissioner*, 15–16.

power centers within the union in order to maintain the flow of commodities between ship and pier.

Several questions arise that are outside the scope of this paper.<sup>20</sup> They may be raised, however, as guides to further research. If the 1951 and previous wildcat strikes are associated with feudalistic elements, did the feudalistic orientation take place in 1945, the time of the first wildcat strike, or has the ILA always been feudalistic? If the ILA has always contained feudalistic elements, were these strikes an indication of a breakdown in the feudalistic structure that resulted in the divergence of power and authority structures? If the structure of the ILA may be compared to the structure of historical political feudalism, is it not possible to generalize as to their origin and breakdown? These questions point to changes in the larger society that have resulted in the breakdown of feudalistic structures and have paved the way for a more bureaucratic orientation.

<sup>20</sup> For these and other suggestions the writer is indebted to Professor Luke Smith, Division of Social Studies, Sweet Briar College, Sweet Briar, Virginia.

# Factors Influencing the Location Of Nonintegrated and Integrated Iron and Steel Centers in Anglo-America

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NONINTEGRATED iron and steel mills are more numerous and more widely dispersed than are integrated and semi-integrated plants.<sup>1</sup> The greater numbers and wider areal distribution of nonintegrated plants suggest that the relative significance of factors influencing their situation at particular places is unlike that of locational agents for integrated and semi-integrated mills.

The purpose of this study is to determine the precise proportion that each locational factor contributes to the establishment of a nonintegrated iron and steel mill at a given locality. The information was obtained by writing all the steel companies listed in *Directory of Iron and Steel Works of the United States and Canada*, published by the American Iron and Steel Institute, New York, 1951. Each executive was asked to indicate the relative significance of the various locational factors in situating his plant or plants.<sup>2</sup>

The respondents were asked to indicate the percentage share, based on 100 per cent, that each of the locational factors shown in Table 1 contributed toward the situation of their particular plant. About 50 per cent of the total queried made replies that could be tabulated. The percentage influence that each factor contributed for all plants on the basis of 100 per cent was then calculated. Obviously there are some shortcomings in such a procedure since there may be a nonresponse bias. Moreover, all firms were treated as similar units and given equal weight.

<sup>1</sup> Nonintegrated mills buy iron and steel goods in semifinished shapes, such as bars, billets, sheets, etc., and shape these forms into finished articles; or they produce perhaps only a basic material, such as pig iron. On the other hand, integrated and semi-integrated mills start with basic raw materials and turn out finished and semifinished commodities.

<sup>2</sup> The author has utilized data from publications and industrial communications. Most of the information, however, came from replies to questionnaires and personal communications from individuals in, or closely connected with, the iron and steel industry.

In addition, those questioned were asked to give replies on the basis of judgments and opinions. Results based on such judgments are, of course, not completely reliable, but they do supply better information than has been available heretofore. Locational factors (and their proportional share of the whole) for nonintegrated plants will be compared to similar situative agents for integrated and semi-integrated mills. Similarities or differences will be recounted, and factual statements will be made or reasonable inferences drawn to suggest reasons for correspondence or discrepancy. In short, locational factors in the nonintegrated iron and steel industry will be inventoried and analyzed quantitatively.

The results of the tabulation of questionnaire replies are shown in Table 1. This tabulation was obtained by dividing the sum of percentages for any given factor by the total number of replies.

TABLE 1  
Percentage Share of Total of Each Locational Factor Listed

	Percentage
Access to manufacturer's market . . . . .	21.7
Access to raw materials . . . . .	11.5*
Access to consumer market . . . . .	8.5
Personal preference of company executive . . . . .	7.7
Access to rail transportation . . . . .	7.5
Access to electric power . . . . .	5.9
Access to skilled labor . . . . .	5.7
Access to highway transportation . . . . .	5.6
Access to unskilled labor . . . . .	4.7
Historical accident . . . . .	4.7
Land available for plant expansion . . . . .	4.5
Adequate water supply . . . . .	2.5
Recommendation of public or private planning agency . . . . .	1.7
Access to water transportation . . . . .	1.6
Favorable tax rates . . . . .	1.5
Favorable wage scale . . . . .	1.1
Suitable physical site . . . . .	1.0
Climate . . . . .	0.8
Access to power (other than electric) . . . . .	0.7
Adequate waste disposal facilities . . . . .	0.7
Strength of labor union . . . . .	0.3
Strategic considerations . . . . .	0.1
Total . . . . .	100.0

\* Most of the raw materials were semifinished steel forms supplied by integrated or semi-integrated plants. Other raw materials were listed as well, but were so varied as to make a separate listing impractical.

A consolidation of the various component parts of major locational factors shows the percentage shares indicated in Table 2. The figures in Table 2 were

obtained by combining similar items from Table 1. For example, the 30.2 per cent share for "Access to market" in Table 2 is the sum of 21.7 per cent for "Access to manufacturer's market" plus 8.5 per cent for "Access to consumer market" from Table 1. Other items in Table 2 are similar combinations from Table 1.

TABLE 2

Proportional Share of Major Locational Factors

	Percentage
Access to market . . . . .	30.2
Access to transportation . . . . .	14.7
Historical accident and personal preference . . . . .	12.4
Access to raw materials . . . . .	11.5
Access to labor . . . . .	10.4
Access to power . . . . .	6.6
Site and situation . . . . .	5.5
Water supply and waste disposal . . . . .	3.2
Planning and strategic considerations . . . . .	1.8
Favorable tax rates . . . . .	1.5
Strength of labor union and wage scale . . . . .	1.4
Climate . . . . .	0.8
Total . . . . .	100.0

When compared to similar percentage figures for integrated and semi-integrated mills in Anglo-America, the results are somewhat startling.<sup>3</sup> Some of the most surprising discrepancies are indicated in Table 3.

TABLE 3

Comparison between Selected Locational Factors for Nonintegrated Plants and Integrated and Semi-integrated Plants

	Nonintegrated Percentage	Integrated and Semi-integrated Percentage
Access to market . . . . .	30.2	21.5
Access to transportation . . . . .	14.7	17.0
Historical accident and personal preference . . . . .	12.4	3.2
Access to raw materials . . . . .	11.5	26.0
Access to labor . . . . .	10.4	9.2
Access to power . . . . .	6.6	11.2

<sup>3</sup> A similar survey, using the same sampling techniques, has been made by the author for integrated and semi-integrated plants, and the results are to be published in an article in press.

The remainder of this study is devoted to a brief analysis of each of the major locational factors, and to a comparison between situative influences for nonintegrated mills on the one hand, and integrated and semi-integrated plants on the other.

#### *Access to Market*

Nonintegrated iron and steel mills are more dispersed and have greater mobility than their integrated and semi-integrated counterparts. The capital investment for nonintegrated plants is usually much less than for other types. Hence, nonintegrated mills can be widely spread, geographically, because the capital risks are less. In addition, their smaller size permits orientation toward lesser markets and thus gives rise to greater areal distribution of plants.

According to Table 3, the primary consideration for nonintegrated plant location in the past has been, and probably remains, access to market. This is in contrast to integrated and semi-integrated plants, which are located primarily with reference to accessibility of raw material. It should be noted that raw materials generally consumed by nonintegrated plants, such as bars, billets, sheets, etc., are materially less bulky and have greater value per unit than comparable raw materials, such as coal, iron ore, and limestone, commonly consumed by integrated and semi-integrated plants. Therefore, assembly freight costs for nonintegrated plants are materially less than those for integrated plants.<sup>4</sup>

Since product market is the ultimate consideration of any plant, the fact that raw material assembly is less costly for nonintegrated plants has enabled the locators of these mills to focus greater attention upon it as a prime factor. Most of the manufactured materials are supplied to other manufacturers, who carry the fabrication one step further, or construct, from component parts, an entirely different item.

#### *Access to Transportation*

Transportation has been the second most important agent situating nonintegrated mills at particular places. The 14.7 per cent share of the total attributed to transportation for the nonintegrated industry compares with a 17 per cent share for integrated plants. Executives of both integrated and nonintegrated mills have considered railroads the most important of the transportation agencies, but rail transportation ranks 7.5 per cent for nonintegrated plants as contrasted to 9.1 per cent for integrated plants. Water is considered 1.6 per cent important by nonintegrated plants, 4.4 per cent by integrated plants. And nonintegrated plants have placed 5.6 per cent im-

<sup>4</sup> The term "integrated," where used alone in the remainder of this paper, refers to both integrated and semi-integrated plants unless otherwise noted.

portance upon truck transportation as contrasted to 3.5 per cent by integrated mills.<sup>5</sup>

These facts are probably due to the smaller amounts of raw materials to be assembled at nonintegrated mills and to the necessity for greater flexibility (provided by truck transport) in the distribution of a variety of finished commodities. In addition, it should be noted that water transportation is much less important for the nonintegrated mills because individual shipments are less bulky and generally must be moved to a customer more rapidly than is feasible by water transport.

### *Historical Accident and Personal Preference*

It appears incongruous that a 12.4 per cent share would be given to historical accident and personal preference in the situation of any industry. Yet, such haphazard choice of locality, to the extent of 12.4 per cent, has been applied in the nonintegrated iron and steel industry.

Smaller capital risks in the nonintegrated industry have made the investor more reckless with his money. However, sound locational analysis can make no practical sense out of this apparent anomaly.

### *Access to Raw Materials*

Since raw materials consumed by nonintegrated mills are generally more valuable per unit and less bulky than those consumed by integrated steel industries, it is less important for nonintegrated plants to be located near the source of raw materials. It should not be inferred, of course, that access to raw materials is unimportant, but merely that proximate location of raw materials is of less significance to nonintegrated than to integrated plants. For example, access to raw materials is more than twice as important to executives of integrated and semi-integrated plants as to those of nonintegrated plants (Table 3).

### *Access to Labor*

As most nonintegrated mills are smaller establishments than their integrated equivalents, their total labor requirements are much smaller, but labor is more important percentagewise to producers in nonintegrated plants than to those in integrated ones (Table 3). Most of Anglo-America has a sufficiently large labor force to accommodate the needs of nonintegrated plants. This fact, coupled with modern mobility of labor, explains why those responsible for determining the location of nonintegrated plants place "Access to labor" last among the five leading factors.

<sup>5</sup> These figures show the relative importance of the three transportation factors in "Access to transportation," Table 3.

*Lesser Factors*

A greater number of factors has been considered in the location of non-integrated plants than in that of integrated mills. None which have contributed less than 10 per cent of the total share are considered separately, however. This tabulation reflects: (1) the dominance of a small group of major locational factors for integrated mills, and (2) a larger variety of products and a multiplicity of processes involved in nonintegrated plants. Individual plants may have an almost unique set of requirements. Hence, when individual reports to questionnaires are submerged in a statistical analysis, the results become less meaningful because of the heterogeneous character of the components to the statistical measure of central tendency.

*Summary*

Location of nonintegrated iron and steel mills has been based upon criteria differing quite markedly in emphasis from those employed in the location of integrated and semi-integrated plants. The most important factors tending to situate integrated and semi-integrated mills at particular places have been: access to raw materials, access to market, access to transportation, and access to power, in that order. On the other hand, for nonintegrated plants the most important situative agents in descending order of importance have been: access to market, access to transportation, historical accident and personal preference, access to raw materials, and access to labor. A greater number of factors has been considered in locating nonintegrated industries, and a greater significance has been attached to minor factors by their producers.

# The Actual Costs of Home Ownership

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THE EXPENDITURE for housing is the second largest item in the average family budget. Differences that exist are due to geography, the family's way of life, and income level, probably the most important determinant. Since differences in housing correspond to differences in income, the allocation for shelter is more a result of economic well-being than a cause of it. The highest proportion of a family budget is expended for housing at the lowest income levels. As income increases, the percentage spent declines, so that the smallest percentage of family income is spent for housing at the highest income levels. Home buying, as well, varies directly with income, with the highest percentage of houses purchased by the self-employed and managerial classes and the lowest percentage by service and unskilled workers.

Despite the mounting price of dwellings in the postwar period, a growing number of consumers have been purchasing houses. Legislation for veterans, the prosperity of the postwar years, high money incomes, the large accumulation of liquid assets, ample mortgage money, and the FHA insurance of mortgage loans have been the major economic factors encouraging home buying. Houses have been bought because of a change in consumption patterns, internal shifts of the population, a high rate of family formation, and the suburbanization process in the postwar period. To many consumers, even those without adequate financial ability, a home has become a fundamental prerequisite for stability.

The trend of dwelling units occupied by owners exhibits diverse patterns.<sup>1</sup> Farm and nonfarm owner-occupancy moved in opposite directions from 1890 to 1940. The percentage for farm owner-occupancy declined constantly from 1890 to 1940 while that of nonfarm exhibited a secular increase until 1940. The sharp drop from 1930 to 1940 was due to the great liquidation

<sup>1</sup> The data refer to existing houses, not to new houses. A dwelling is classified as owner-occupied if the owner lives in it, irrespective of the number of dwelling units it contains. The typical owner-occupied American home, however, is a one-dwelling structure with no other dwellings or living units on the premises.

of houses caused by the 1929-32 recession and the troublesome thirties. From 1940 to 1950 all forms of owner-occupancy increased. Over the decade, urban owner-occupancy increased by 35 per cent, rural farm, by 23 per cent, and rural nonfarm by 21 per cent. By 1950 the country had become a nation of homeowners as well as of aspiring homeowners.

Purchasing a house is a complex venture involving a large number of entrepreneurial decisions. Paying for this object of joint consumption generally involves the outlay of more money than any other single purchase made by the average family during its existence. Since a family generally purchases a house only once, most houses are acquired by people who are novices in the market. After deciding to purchase a home, there is a large number of financial decisions to be made by the buyer. The most important include the price of the house, its carrying charges, the relation of these to average annual income, and the size of the down payment. A basic decision is the relation of price to the average annual income of the prospective purchaser. The ratio of price to income standard ranges from 1.5 to 2.5. It is usually agreed that for annual incomes less than \$3,000 the maximum limit is 1.5, and for incomes in excess of \$3,000 the ratio can increase to 2.5. For incomes above \$10,000 the ratio has no meaning since it naturally declines. A second method for determining ability to support a house is to compute the rent-to-average-annual-income ratio. Theoretically, for annual incomes less than \$3,000, the maximum limit is 15 per cent; for incomes in excess of \$3,000, the ratio can increase to 35 per cent. Actually, of course, the rent-to-income ratio is correlated inversely with income.

The rent-to-income ratio is more variable than the price-to-income ratio, since it is influenced by the size of the down payment, the type and length of mortgage, and the rate of interest, among other factors. For example, as the size of a down payment increases, the carrying charges for a house decline, since the periodic payment for interest and principal is smaller. It is generally considered a sound practice to advance 15 per cent to 35 per cent of a price as down payment, for incomes below \$10,000. The 15 per cent to 35 per cent limits of the rent-to-income ratio are then more reasonably applied. A smaller rate of interest, also, is often secured from a lending agency when a larger down payment is supplied, which can result in a substantial saving. If a 25 per cent down payment means a 4 per cent rate of interest instead of a 5 per cent rate, the difference in interest paid is 20 per cent and not 1 per cent.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The length, type, and basis of amortization of a mortgage also influence the carrying charges, but these are too involved to discuss here. Other criteria for ownership, in addition to the two outlined, can be constructed in terms of different standards of living and income. These tests are too extensive and difficult to apply simply. A third test is suggested later in the paper.

TABLE 1

Ratios of Mortgage Principal and Mortgage Payments to Income, Single-family Dwellings Insured by the FHA under Section 203 of Title II, Federal Housing Act

Year	New Homes				Existing Homes					
	Borrower's Effective Annual Income <sup>1</sup>	Mortgage Principal	Mortgage Payments <sup>2</sup>	Ratio of Principal to Income	Percentage Payments of Income	Borrower's Effective Annual Income <sup>1</sup>	Mortgage Principal	Mortgage Payments <sup>2</sup>	Ratio of Principal to Income	Percentage Payments of Income
1941	\$2,515	\$4,412	\$442.56	1.754	17.60	\$3,011	\$3,995	\$474.00	1.327	15.74
1942	2,721	4,670	456.84	1.716	16.79	3,229	4,298	489.00	1.331	15.14
1943 <sup>a</sup>	....	....	....	....	....	3,505	4,566	510.96	1.303	14.58
1944 <sup>a</sup>	....	....	....	....	....	3,539	4,586	514.92	1.296	14.55
1945 <sup>a</sup>	....	....	....	....	....	3,514	4,614	507.84	1.313	14.45
1946	3,619	5,348	552.72	1.533	15.27	3,640	4,929	519.00	1.354	14.26
1947	3,978	6,345	622.32	1.595	15.64	3,941	5,561	570.36	1.411	14.47
1948	4,404	7,184	704.40	1.631	15.99	4,308	6,181	626.16	1.435	14.53
1949	4,285	7,315	685.80	1.707	16.00	4,742	6,969	700.56	1.470	14.77
1950	4,213	7,307	664.56	1.734	15.77	4,837	7,102	707.28	1.468	14.62
1951	4,662	7,675	703.56	1.646	15.09	5,176	7,469	743.76	1.443	14.37
1952	5,160	8,238	775.56	1.597	15.03	5,425	8,044	787.80	1.483	14.52

<sup>1</sup> The FHA estimate of the earning capacity of the mortgagor likely to prevail during the first third of the mortgage term.

<sup>2</sup> Includes monthly payments during the first year on principal and interest, FHA insurance premium, hazard insurance, taxes, special assessments, and existing ground rent.

\* Not available for new homes.

Source: Absolute data from Federal Housing Administration, *Annual Reports* (1941-52).

It is possible to apply the two criteria to information available for purchasers of government-insured houses. The data in Table 1 refer to single-family dwellings insured by the FHA under Section 203 of Title II under the 1934 National Housing Act and subsequent laws and amendments.<sup>3</sup> For both new and existing houses, the ratio of mortgage principal to effective annual income rose steadily in the postwar period. It declined from 1950 to 1952 for new houses and from 1949 to 1951 for existing houses. The decline from 1950 to 1951 was probably due to Regulation X imposed by the FRB under authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950, effective October 12, 1950.<sup>4</sup> The percentage of mortgage payments to effective annual income rose in the postwar period until 1949, after which it declined a slight amount on both new and existing houses. This may have been a belated reaction to the 1948-49 recession, a result of the Korean outbreak in 1950, and credit controls in 1951. The annual incomes and mortgage payments for new homes declined from 1948 to 1950, suggesting that expanding down payments were being provided by new-home purchasers, in the face of rising prices for new houses. All the underlying aggregates for purchasers of existing homes rose steadily, aside from a slight decline of income and payments from 1944 to 1945. The average income for purchasers of existing homes was generally higher than that for purchasers of new homes, and the mortgage principal generally lower. It is unlikely that purchasers of existing dwellings bought less expensive houses than did the purchasers of new houses, despite their larger incomes. Even though smaller mortgages are secured on existing homes, the purchasers of existing homes had larger incomes and probably supplied larger down payments.

### *Basic Arguments for Ownership*

Ownership is encouraged despite the extensive financial costs that will be described. The three most commonly stressed benefits for ownership are the certainty of housing expense, the fixity of annual housing costs, and a house as a sound investment. These benefits of ownership are re-emphasized in the popular belief that is cheaper to own than to rent. It is naïve, how-

<sup>3</sup> Home mortgages are insured by the FHA under four separate sections of these acts, with Section 203 of Title II authorizing the insurance of mortgages on new and existing one-to-four family dwellings. The principal activity of FHA is carried on under this section, and virtually all mortgages insured under this section are one-family dwellings that are owner-occupied. For insured mortgages, FHA currently specifies a maximum rate of interest at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent, plus an insurance premium of  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Theoretically, there are limits to insured loan ratios, but with the passage of time the FHA has underwritten higher loan ratios amortized over longer periods of time.

<sup>4</sup> The regulation specified maximum amounts to be borrowed, maximum maturities of loans, minimum down payments, and minimum amortization requirements on loans for virtually all one-and-two family houses. The regulation related to new houses was eliminated in September, 1952.

ever, to believe that one can afford to buy if he can afford to rent. The ratio of space-rental value of houses to space-rent for renters has averaged approximately 1.5 from 1929 to 1952, with very little variation in the average from year to year, indicating that ownership is more expensive than renting.<sup>6</sup>

Each of the major financial advantages of ownership can be briefly evaluated. Most people purchase houses during prosperity and incur definite housing expenses at high price levels. This is due to increased financial ability and the advantages of owning during inflation. This is especially true if a house has been purchased at the beginning of a period of rising prices. This buying pattern disregards the possibility of recession and the concomitant decline in the value of real property. Buyers may overestimate their long-run financial ability and underestimate the possibility of a decline in income due to depression, sickness, death, or family dislocation. This is partially evident in Chart I. Despite the long-run increase in owner-occupancy of urban nonfarm dwellings, a 14 per cent decline occurred from 1930 to 1940, due to the sharp recession and the low level of economic activity in the thirties. Foreclosures rose steadily from 1926, the earliest date for which data are available, until 1933, when they reached an all-time high. Thereafter, they declined continuously to 1946 but have been rising steadily since that year.<sup>7</sup> By large undertakings of *certain* housing costs during the postwar inflation and prosperity, buyers have increased the probability of a similar cyclical repetition.

Fixed annual expenditures embody the disadvantages of all inflexible costs. Housing expenses cannot be easily adjusted to conform to personal, social, or economic conditions. Once committed to a house, an important portion of the consumption expenditures of a family is no longer controllable or manipulatable. A family cannot easily adjust housing needs to changing income, since income allocated to housing is predetermined at the time of the purchase of the house.

The most important argument raised in behalf of ownership is that of investment. As soon as this economic benefit is emphasized, an owner's loss of income or alternative income from investment has to be included as a housing cost. A sound investment is also one in which there is opportunity and ability to realize full equity if the investment is shifted. For the small proportion of people who buy houses for the short-run, or buy in recession and sell in prosperity, equity is realized. But the advantage does not accrue to owners who buy houses in prosperity or buy with the intention of using


<sup>6</sup> Computed from data in *Survey of Current Business*, June, 1953, pp. 20, 22.

<sup>7</sup> Data from reports of Housing and Home Finance Agency. The figures after 1933 would have been higher if many states had not acted to prevent foreclosures by suspending tax payments, declaring mortgage moratoria, and forbidding the sale of property for unpaid taxes. The federal government adopted measures such as refinancing mortgages, which kept down the number of foreclosures.

them for a lifetime. A house is not an investment easily altered or controlled. It is difficult for owners to control neighborhood conditions required to maintain the value of their properties, let alone other factors that influence

### CHART I

Percentage of Dwelling Units Occupied by Owners



Sources: Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945*; *Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1950*.

it. Once a general price decline begins, it becomes exceedingly difficult to liquidate houses, except by foreclosure or great losses in equity. With price declines, consumers revert to renting rather than buying, evidenced by a disinvestment in owner-occupied homes. As shown in Chart II (100 per cent minus the top curve), until 1940 renting increased in depression and decreased in prosperity. From 1940 to 1952, however, the percentage of housing expenditures for nonowner-occupancy decreased steadily from 53.3 per cent to 38.3 per cent. Renters, without long-term leases or large termination securities, need fear no danger of a capital loss on investment, a danger faced by owners. When a recession eventuates and many owners are forced to liquidate, they undoubtedly will not recapture their invested capital, or will end by owning a liability instead of an asset.

### *Average Costs of a House*


Since the complete costs of ownership are not always known in advance, millions of people after the Second World War bought homes without being fully aware of the purchasing and carrying costs of a house. Of course, many families had no choice in the postwar period but to acquire this form of shelter, even when they knew the costs involved, but many prospective buyers were not and are not fully aware of the initial expenses of ownership. Commissions and premiums have to be paid to acquire a title and finance a house. The lending agency receives 1 to 1½ per cent of a moderately priced house for the various services it performs and the expenses it pays for the buyer. Lending agencies usually require their mortgagors to deposit money in escrow with them, to pay unforeseen and probable expenses as they arise, an amount varying from 1 to 3 per cent. As insurance for free and clear title and property, about ½ to 1 per cent of the price of a house is paid for title search and insurance. The buyer's attorney is paid ½ to 1 per cent of the price of a house for his services. Finally, expenses arise to prepare the dwelling for occupancy, which are variable and depend to an important extent upon whether the house is new or not.

For the purpose of illustrating the complete costs of ownership, a detailed and average list of costs of a moderately priced, hypothetical house is shown in Table 2. It must be remembered that all the amortization, operating, and imputed costs of occupancy are assumed by the buyer. The cost of the dwelling, garage, and land is \$10,000. A down payment of \$2,000 is provided, with a mortgage at 5 per cent for twenty years. The mortgage principal agrees quite well with the average expenditure for houses in the country from 1947 to 1952.<sup>†</sup> For the \$8,000 loan, a sum of \$12,672 is re-

<sup>†</sup> The actual, average expenditures for the years 1947 to 1952 were \$7,100, \$9,000, \$7,000, \$9,400, \$9,300, and \$11,800. The unweighted mean expenditure for the period was \$8,933. Basic data in the FRB reprints of *Survey of Consumer Finances* (1947-53).

## CHART II

Nonfarm Owner-Occupant Housing Expenditures as Percentage of Total Housing, and Expenditures for Housing and Household Operations as Percentage of Total Consumption, 1929-52



Sources: United States Department of Commerce, *National Income, 1951 Edition*, supplement to *Survey of Current Business*; *Survey of Current Business*, July 1952, July 1953.

paid to the mortgagee in twenty years, at the fully amortized rate of \$52.80 a month. If a down payment larger than 20 per cent were supplied, the annual interest charge and principal repayment would be smaller. On the other hand, as will be noted, the implicit loss of investment income would be larger and the direct tax-benefit smaller. If the full price of a house is paid in cash, the loss of investment income is maximized and the direct tax-benefits minimized, thereby making the actual cost of ownership higher than is generally figured.

Insurance is the first operating cost shown in Table 2. Nearly all lending

TABLE 2

Average Annual Cost of a \$10,000 House

	Annual Cost	
	Amount	Percentage of Total
<i>Amortization Costs</i>		
Principal, \$8,000 fully amortized loan for twenty years.....	\$ 400.00	31.2
Interest, 5 per cent per annum, compounded monthly.....	233.60	18.2
<i>Operating Costs</i>		
<i>Insurance:</i>		
Fire on dwelling and garage, \$.425 per \$100 for three years on \$13,000 .....	18.42	1.4
Fire on personal property, \$.500 per \$100 for three years on \$2,000 .....	3.33	0.3
Comprehensive personal liability, \$.25 for three years on \$10,000 .....	8.33	0.6
Hazard on dwelling and garage, \$.350 per \$100 for three years on \$13,000 .....	15.17	1.2
Hazard on personal property, \$.175 per \$100 for three years on \$2,000 .....	1.17	0.1
<i>Taxes:</i>		
Property, \$.350 per \$100 on assessed valuation of \$8,000...	280.00	21.8
Water .....	22.50	1.8
<i>Maintenance:</i>		
Dwelling and garage, 1 per cent of 80 per cent of price....	80.00	6.2
Land, 1/2 per cent of 20 per cent of price .....	10.00	0.8
Fuel .....	121.00	9.4
Sundry .....	77.52	6.0
<i>Imputed Costs</i>		
Loss of income, 3 per cent per annum, compounded annually on \$2,000 for twenty years .....	80.61	6.3
<i>Depreciation:</i>		
Dwelling and garage, 3 per cent of 75 per cent of down payment .....	45.00	3.5
Land, 1 per cent of 25 per cent of down payment .....	5.00	0.4
Tax Credit, on interest plus property taxes plus loss of income .....	-118.84	-9.2
<b>Aggregate Annual Costs .....</b>	<b>\$ 1,282.81</b>	<b>100.0</b>

agencies require an owner to carry fire, liability, and hazard insurance in order to protect their investment.<sup>8</sup> An owner generally requires a higher amount of fire insurance on personal property than a renter, because an owner tends to own more personal property. The amounts for the three types of insurance shown in Table 2 were not arbitrarily determined. Fire insurance (including lightning) on dwelling and garage usually exceeds the value of a house due to: (a) the insistence of the lending agency; (b) the desire of the owner to protect his equity, especially if he has supplied a large down payment; (c) the "co-insurance" principle, and the tendency of insurance companies to pay a percentage of the real fire damage, based upon their own estimates; (d) the higher replacement cost for houses. Liability and hazard insurance cover the standard risks. The costs for fire, hazard, and comprehensive personal liability insurance vary with many factors, which need not be discussed here. Fire and hazard insurance on personal property shown in Table 2 involve only a reasonable excess of insurance. For all types, low rates have been employed on the basis of discounted three-year policies.

A realty tax is applied to an assessed valuation of property, and these valuations tend to be lower than market prices during prosperous times. A valuation equal to the mortgage loan is employed in Table 2. The rate of \$3.50 per \$100.00 includes the basic tax rate and assessment for general improvements, so that special assessments are excluded. A water tax rate can be calculated in many ways, and in terms of the frontage and water facilities of an average house, the water tax is estimated at \$22.50 per annum.

From an investment standpoint, when other things are equal, if the amount spent for maintenance, upkeep, and repair equals a depreciation allowance, an asset maintains its value. Actually, other things are rarely constant, so that care and repair of a house are constantly required to maintain value because of its tendency to decline in value, especially from a long-run view. Repair and replacement involve so many variables that their costs cannot be calculated exactly. A lower limit for maintenance is employed in Table 2. If the 1½ per cent minimum maintenance is split between 1 per cent for upkeep of the house and garage and ½ per cent for the land, it is

<sup>8</sup> A family normally acquires many types of insurance. Personal-property floaters cover every possible risk on personal property, inside and outside the house, including fire and accident. Burglary and theft insurance cover all personal property except furs, jewelry, and silverware, upon which separate floaters are required. These types of insurance are excluded as specific costs to the homeowner, even though rates and policy values tend to be higher for separate dwellings. War-damage insurance acquired by many owners is also excluded, as are heavier liability insurance on automobiles, assumed by owners because they are property owners, and amortization insurance, geared to pay a mortgage in the event of the mortgagor's death.

equivalent to a partial depreciation of the house and garage over a hundred years and the land over two hundred years.

Space-rent generally includes the cost of heat and hot water, but an owner purchases his own fuel. Fuel costs vary, of course, with many factors. For an efficient but inexpensive hot water and heating system in a climate requiring heat a third of the year, with moderate demands of a household for water and room temperature, fuel cost is substantial. It is a reasonable minimum fuel estimate to consider the monthly cost \$11.00, as shown in Table 2.

The miscellaneous operating expenses of owners include items that are real in occurrence but variable among owners. They may include transportation costs, garbage collection charges, higher expenses for utilities, shopping costs, et cetera. This sundry expense has been arbitrarily set at \$6.46 a month.

The first "imputed" cost in Table 2 is frequently in dispute as a cost of ownership. Few owners consider the income lost on deprived investment a cost, despite the fact that they deny themselves income to invest in a house. The income loss on investment represents the extra charge for owning a house. If an owner invests \$10,000 at 3 per cent, annually compounded, for twenty years, the average annual income from the investment is \$403. Over a period of twenty years the investor can accrue a sum, even after taxes, equal to approximately three-fifths of the value of a \$10,000 house. At a minimum, lost income equals the income earnable on a down payment. If the \$2,000 down payment was invested in 3 per cent government bonds, the earned income would average \$80.61 per year. Actually, with a \$2,000 down payment, the additional cost for interest, a fully paid mortgage in twenty years, and any excessive cost in ownership compared to renting, the lost income is much larger. The minimum amount of income lost on the down payment represents the annual cost to an owner for tying up his funds in a house.

A second cost about which there is also dispute is depreciation. It is evident that almost any asset held for the long-run can be sold at a relatively small price, barring an inflation, fortuitous occurrence, or sufficient maintenance. If the house in Table 2 was purchased outright and sold after thirty to fifty years, within the stated assumptions, the resale value of the property would be very low. The depreciation becomes most evident in the loss taken by an owner when he sells property. However, few owners include a charge for depreciation or make any other allowance for it—until they become landlords. When a dwelling is owner-occupied, the wear, tear, decay, and obsolescence lowering its value represent a loss of equity to the owner. Even changes in architectural fashions are a vital cause of declines in housing values. Maintenance and repair charges are recognized as part of depreciation, for though owners tend to ignore depreciation, it is impossible to disregard maintenance. The faster the physical depreciation of a house, the

larger the expenditures for repair and replacement. A house can be properly maintained and its value still depreciate due to the locational factor. It is unlikely, therefore, that a house maintains its value over the long-run, even from the standpoint of fashion and location, let alone cyclical and secular uncertainties.

The principal portion of the amortization represents part of the depreciated cost, but the equity in property represented by the down payment has to be depreciated. The prorated portion of the house and garage represented by the down payment is depreciated at 3 per cent, or over thirty-three and a third years. Since it is best to depreciate land separately, the prorated down payment represented in the land has been written off in Table 2 over a hundred years, a more generous period. If the principal portion of the amortization, the maintenance, and the down payment are combined, the weighted rate of depreciation equals 2.7 per cent per annum, meaning that the value of the house is being charged off over thirty-seven years.<sup>9</sup>

There are two direct financial benefits gained from ownership, but *only under the condition that an owner has taxable income*. If an owner invested elsewhere than in a house, the income from that investment would be taxable. The annual loss of income from owning a house, \$80.61 in Table 2, would be subject to income taxation. The minimum direct saving accruing to an owner is due to the deduction of the realty tax and mortgage interest for personal income tax purposes. The exact deduction for the direct benefit in Table 2 is \$513.60, and if the imputed loss of income is included, the total is \$594.21. The precise tax benefit depends upon the size of an individual's income, his deductions, and the tax bracket of his taxable income. If an individual had taxable income that fell into the bracket with the lowest rate, approximately 20 per cent under the rates effective January 1, 1954, the total tax saving on \$594.21 would be the \$118.84 shown in Table 2. The direct tax benefit would be 20 per cent of \$513.60, or \$102.72.

### *Tests of Ownership Ability*

The major annual costs of a house have been listed and described. Other major and minor costs, of a nonrepetitive nature, have not been included. In terms of average costs, three basic standards for supporting a house are applicable: (1) the price of a house should average twice the annual income; (2) housing expense should average 25 per cent of annual income; (3) the average consumption expenditure for housing and household opera-

<sup>9</sup> The principal portion of the amortization is 5 per cent of \$8,000; the maintenance is 1 per cent of \$8,000 for the house and garage and  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of \$2,000 for the land; and the down payment is 3 per cent of \$1,500 for the house and garage and 1 per cent of \$500 for the land.

tions from the postwar period 1946-52 can be applied to reconstruct the required annual income for a house.

On the basis of the first standard, an annual income of \$5,000 is derived; \$5,131 (four times annual cost from Table 2) is derived by the second standard. The value of the first standard is below that of the second standard because the 20 per cent down payment is disregarded. As the size of the down payment is increased, the value of the second standard would approach the value of the first. However, if the income of a family was near these estimates, the cost of ownership probably would be greater, since tax savings decrease as income decreases. Without taxable income, annual costs would be 9 per cent larger. The estimated and required incomes are above the average effective incomes of purchasers of new homes in 1951 (Table 1), even though the mortgage principal in Table 2 is only slightly higher. The mortgage principal shown in Table 2 is higher than the principal for purchasers of existing homes in Table 1, though the average incomes are approximately the same. In 1952 the incomes and principals for new and existing homes were higher than the income estimates and the mortgage principal in Table 2.

A third procedure can be employed to compare the cost of ownership with the average housing expenditures in the country. The percentage of total housing expenditures for nonfarm owner-occupants declined almost steadily from 1929 to 1940, after which it increased constantly until 1952, an increase of 32 per cent. The percentage of total consumption expenditures for housing behaved invertedly, cyclically, until 1944, but continued to decline until 1947. It rose constantly from 1947 to 1952, an increase of 26 per cent. It was no coincidence that 1947 and 1948 were the first postwar years in which the housing demands of consumers were being met, after about one and a half decades of disinvestment in housing. The percentage spent for housing and household operations behaved similarly to housing, though it started to rise sooner after the war, in 1946, because of the ease of converting industry to the production of household items. The percentage of total consumption expenditures for housing operations (the difference between the lower two curves, in Chart II) behaved more variably. It rose almost steadily until 1940, declining during the war until the end of 1945. It rose thereafter, except for one decline in the 1948-49 recession and a second one from 1950-52. The latter decline was probably due to Regulation W prescribed by the FRB under the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the fulfillment of the major demand of consumers for quasi-durable goods.

For the postwar years 1946-52 a weighted average of 23.2 per cent of personal consumption expenditures was for housing and household operations. Despite its shortcomings as a criterion, this is a third standard employed to determine the annual income required to support a house. If this

percentage is applied to the annual cost of ownership shown in Table 2, an annual income of \$5,529 is required. The estimated income is greater than values obtained by the other two standards and much greater than the effective incomes of purchasers of new and existing houses (Table 1), despite the fact that except for 1952 the mortgage principal in Table 2 is only slightly larger in the postwar period compared to that in Table 1.

A similar comparison can be made in terms of the alternative costs in Table 2, excluding the loss of income, depreciation, and tax savings on lost income. If this less realistic basis for costs is employed, many of the implicit costs of ownership are neglected. Eventually they show up in the sale price, a disappearance of equity, and the depreciation of the property. In terms of this means of computing the expenses of a house—by excluding the three implicit costs—the annual expenses are reduced by  $(\$80.61 + \$50.00 - \$16.12)$  or \$114.49. In terms of the first standard, the required annual income remains the same, \$5,000 per annum. The second standard produces a required annual income of \$4,673 and the third criterion an annual income of \$5,036. If incomes so low as to exclude tax savings prevailed, the annual cost of a house would be 9 per cent higher. These adjusted estimates are more nearly equal to the average effective annual incomes in Table 1, except for 1952, but in excess of the average income for the country.

### *Conclusions*

Based upon the comparisons, it appears that one or more of the following conclusions are tentatively correct:

- a) Homeowners are cutting back their consumption of other goods to support and finance their houses.
- b) Homeowners are liquidating assets, employing short term loans, and putting liens upon future incomes because of excessive housing expenditures.<sup>10</sup>
- c) A substantial annual income is required to buy and support a house, as indicated by these estimates.
- d) Homeowners are exceeding the theoretical and safe standards for housing because of the pressure of high prices upon their margin for shelter.
- e) Homeowners are disregarding many costs of ownership.

Most likely depreciation and loss of income are being ignored, for reasons noted. Other costs are more difficult to ignore, though a few, such as maintenance, can be minimized. However, if maintenance is minimized, the depreciation of a house is hastened, thereby destroying equity as rapidly as it is established through amortization. The owner can evade certain costs at

<sup>10</sup> For an extensive discussion of these two factors, see W. I. Greenwald and S. E. Greenwald, "The Postwar Financial Position of the Consumer," *Current Economic Comment*, XV, No. 2 (May, 1953), 35-44.

definite risks, disregard other expenses though they arise at some time, or ignore costs that are real and operative. However, the actual economic costs of ownership cannot be avoided without ultimate cost to the owner.

Qualitative factors of a psychological, personal, and social nature favorable to ownership have not been weighed. The economic disadvantages of ownership are not necessarily commensurate with these factors and may be counterbalanced by alternative sociological and psychological elements. When qualitative considerations are combined with the financial requirements for ownership, tempered by a proper adjustment for real housing income, it is evident that many consumers in the postwar period have neglected or been unable to consider all the actual costs of owning houses. It is very likely that the costs will be borne by a growing proportion of homeowners, in varying degrees, with the passage of time.

# A Comment and Rejoinder on "Water Development as an Important Factor in the Utilization Of the High Plains of Texas"<sup>1</sup>

## *A Comment*

COMMENTS CONTAINED in an appraisal of this nature can be most easily misunderstood. Various approaches readily present themselves. A commentator may confine his observations to the value of the contribution made to the understanding of area problems and to solvents for these, insofar as technological developments provide them. In these respects Mr. Baker has done an excellent job, and his efforts and achievements deserve only the praise due any such pioneering endeavor.

A second approach may direct comment toward an appraisal of certain premises and conclusions, tangent at least, to the primary area of interest, to which the author has devoted some attention. This latter slant prompts me to say that Mr. Baker has not confined himself either to a description of the evolution of water-lifting devices or to year-to-year effects measured in terms of acres brought under pump irrigation. This is, perhaps, as it should have been. But it is precisely in these areas that differences of emphasis, if not of opinion, arise. These differences necessarily exist in respect to the implications of changes in simple-phase technology, especially when these are interspersed with a considerable number of less evident technological variables.

Hence, the chief purpose of this discussion is not to minimize the value of Mr. Baker's article, but to cast a few shadows of doubt concerning some of his conclusions in respect to significant causative factors in the economic development of the Great Plains area.

The economy of, and the techniques employed within, an area are a part of the aggregate economy, not isolated from it. This situation derives largely from the composite of technological developments associated with improved transportation and increased tendencies toward both individual producer

<sup>1</sup> Riley E. Baker, *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, XXXIV (September, 1953), p. 21.

and area specialization. The network of interrelationships is not an easy one to explain. Nevertheless, this difficulty does not warrant simplification merely for ease of explanation. Some passages in Mr. Baker's paper explicitly, and others by implication, indicate that he leans toward undue simplification, intentional or otherwise.

There has appeared a tendency in recent years to interpret the implications of a vastly expanding technological front in terms of the impacts of a few selected techniques lifted from their functional relationships within the integrated whole. This tendency is probably the inevitable result of preliminary observations of the influences of wide technological advances upon the entire structure of an economy.

The impacts of such technological advances ordinarily strike first in the more highly integrated areas of an economy and subsequently extend themselves rather rapidly toward the periphery of that economy. So it is, then, that improved transportation, more intensified land use, and the rise of secondary and tertiary phases of an economy are somewhat belated developments in the remote areas of an economy. The High Plains region of Texas, just as the whole of the so-called "Western frontier," has been such an area. Such areas have been destined to record substantial economic development and growth along with the total economy, deriving from over-all economic expansion. Efforts to ascertain how much of that growth can be attributed to one particular technological advance and how much to another seem a bit unfruitful.

A quotation from Mr. Baker's article that carries strong implications concerning the effects of water-lifting techniques, and that at the same time crowds other causal factors into the background, is that "in 1900 the twenty-seven counties of the Texas High Plains supported fewer than 16,000 people. . . . At the present time this same region that was nonirrigable only half a century ago supports a population of 398,000." There exists a multitude of reasons to believe that the present population of the area would near this figure without irrigation of any land in the area. True, land values would not be nearly so high, yields per acre would be much lower, and quite a few farmers would be less prosperous. A few more farm laborers in the area have been required as the result of irrigation, but they, along with additional laborers needed for the handling of a larger volume of farm output, are probably a negligible factor in accounting for the aggregate population increase within the area; especially is this true of the urban component of the aggregate increase.

It is quite generally known that areas in proximity to the one in consideration have experienced approximately the same proportional growth in population and economic activity without the asset of irrigation. With relatively little irrigation in the Abilene area, and despite a devastating drought

for three or four years in the area, the nonagricultural sector of the economy of the area has experienced such phenomenal expansion as to almost overshadow the effect of the drought. To a much smaller extent, of course, has this factor prevailed for individual farmers affected by the drought. However, their misfortune hardly reflected itself in the aggregate economy because of the shrinking importance of agriculture in the total. So it was in the Great Plains that the agricultural activity added by irrigation and the consequent prosperity of the farmers have figured as relatively minor factors in the economic expansion of the Great Plains of Texas. Yet Mr. Baker follows the above quotation with the statement that "vastly increased development of the underground water supply is the most important single factor contributing to this transformation."

Had Mr. Baker obtained information relative to the rate of economic expansion for the area prior to the development of successful large-scale irrigation within the area, and had he ascertained also whether or not, for the most part, the land put under irrigation had been previously settled by farmers who were raising the same crops—with less spectacular yields, to be sure—under conditions of dry farming, such information would have been most relevant. The presentation of some generally known statistics of the acreage under cultivation, and of the wheat and grain sorghum production of that area by the end of World War I, would have been also very relevant. But these data would have dampened Mr. Baker's enthusiasm concerning the results of the more intensive utilization of land by irrigation by way of contrast to the claims made in the quotations above.

Additional data of the nature mentioned above become especially relevant in view of another observation on the part of Mr. Baker to the effect that "the year 1911 is usually given as the date of the beginning of successful large-scale irrigation in the Texas Panhandle. However, the most spectacular increase in the amount of underground water used has occurred since 1935." Judgments hinged on this statement would necessitate the conclusion that the "transformation" referred to above has taken place largely since 1935. However, United States Bureau of Census and United States Department of Agriculture statistics pertaining to the growth of the High Plains economy since 1901 seem not to bear out this implication.

Some of the foregoing, and somewhat untenable, positions in which Mr. Baker finds himself derive from the fact that he did not confine himself to "research concerning the westward movement of 'well-drilling culture.'" Where he has done so, he has done a very creditable piece of research.

At one other point in particular, Mr. Baker shunts around a core problem relative to factors determining the rate of expansion of technological advance from the initial areas of its use into the outer fringes of a machine culture. It is quite conceivable that the more advanced stages of drilling and

pumping techniques could have been extensively used in certain phases of our more highly developed Eastern economy and their use retarded at the Western fringes for reasons other than the absence of specific technological advances, e.g., water-lifting devices, barbed wire, windmills, etc.

This point is supported in part by Mr. Baker's statement that "there is a striking resemblance between the pictures of rigs that were in use on the High Plains sometime prior to 1900 and the machine patented by Levi Disbrow in 1830." At this point he observes further that "it might follow that the well-drilling equipment used to drill the water wells in the Texas Panhandle was made in the East, shipped west on the railroad, and employed as the tools of professional well drillers." However, the period that elapsed between 1830 and "sometime prior to 1900" is a rather long one, and reasons for the retardation in the utilization of such drilling equipment on the High Plains cannot be explained in terms of the necessity of utilizing that much time in transporting such equipment from the Pennsylvania and Ohio oil fields to the High Plains. This observation is significant, especially since it notes that this equipment was "shipped west on the railroad."

It is important to remember that an interest in well drilling on the High Plains coincided with an interest in cattle ranching in the area. This, in turn, was coincident with the profitability of driving herds of cattle to the western termini of railroads in Kansas, to be subsequently transported to market areas farther north and east for consumption largely by factory workers there. The casual technological sequence goes on and on. Hence the impossibility of explaining economic transformation largely in terms of the cause-and-effect relationships implicitly associated with a single technological innovation lifted from the over-all matrix in which it was conceived.

Mr. Baker quotes from J. Evetts Haley a passage that has implicit in it many reasons for the economic transformation of the High Plains of Texas. It is as follows:

In 1887 there were less than two thousand people in the Panhandle, and only a very small percent of this number was upon the XIT Ranch. The droughts of 1891 to 1893 were a serious set-back to immigration, but the tide flowed again in the late nineties. Though immigration was steady in 1904 and 1905, few actual settlers bought Capitol land until after 1906, and not until 1913 and 1914 did such sales get well under way.

The tide of Western advance that got started in the early nineties and that "flowed again in the late nineties" has continued since that time, with ups and downs, of course, in ever greater volume and force. A similar situation prevailed during and after the "Oklahoma Rush." The story is universal. Hence concepts of lesser frontiers have to be spliced together eventually into concepts of great frontiers.

America was conceived in an atmosphere of expanding technology. A limited number of people could not all at once transform a vast continent; remote areas had to wait their turn. So did the Great Plains have to wait its turn. A vast tide of both peoples and technologies flooded Western areas, including the Great Plains, and these as aggregate normative influences effected the great transformation of the Great Plains. Any single technological innovation would be a mere lone voice crying in the economic wilderness.

C. A. Wiley

University of Texas

### *A Rejoinder*

THE AUTHOR was not aware that the article would convey the impression that water development is the only causative factor in the economic development of the High Plains. Nor was there conscious intent to attach an immutable priority to any one causative factor. But since a question has been raised concerning the degree of emphasis used by the writer, some clarification is necessary.

Most of the confusion seems to center around the statement, "Vastly increased development of the underground water supply is the most important single factor contributing to this transformation." The "transformation" referred to is the transformation of 1,900,000 acres of "nonirrigable land" into "irrigated land." There was no intent to imply that there exists a year-by-year correlation between the amount of water used for irrigation and the increase in population. Perhaps the sentence would have been less easily misunderstood had it been worded: "The significant increase in the number of acres irrigated on the High Plains during the past fifty years was made possible by the use of vastly improved devices for exploiting the underground water supply."

While there were many factors that impeded the utilization of the resources of the Texas High Plains, attention was focused on water development because of the more than usual significance of the water problem in this area as compared to other frontier areas. A means of making the underground water supply accessible was of extraordinary importance to the area under discussion because water was not readily obtainable from the sources commonly used in other semiarid areas. Without water, not only would irrigation have been impossible but utilization of the other resources of the area would have been seriously handicapped. Without deep wells, there would have been insufficient water to support any increase in population after the first few years of settlement.

Riley E. Baker  
Stephenville, Texas

# Book Reviews

*Edited by*

MALCOLM H. MACDONALD

MAX BELOFF: *Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-1951*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1953. 278 pages. \$4.00.

Soviet policy toward the Far East between 1944 and 1951 was neither mysterious nor enigmatic, but the documentation of certain important events is still incomplete, and a good deal remains to be learned about the implementation of Soviet policy. Mr. Beloff, with his undoubted competence in handling Soviet diplomatic materials, makes the best possible use of the documentation uncovered by his searching hand and offers a most useful reference guide to a complex subject. Quite naturally, his major concern is with the development of Sino-Soviet relations (four chapters); but he also reminds us that Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia are important theaters of Soviet political interest within the Far Eastern area. Each of these country-areas receives its own chapter of attention, though Indonesia, Viet-Nam, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, and the Philippines necessarily receive cursory treatment in the chapter on Southeast Asia contributed by J. Frankel.

Mr. Beloff usually speaks in the past tense—indicative or subjunctive. A general tone of cautious reserve attaches to the expression of his judgments, as though he understood full well that another year might uncover documentary refutation for poor

guesses. Consequently, little in this volume is likely to settle doubtful questions or throw additional light on problems of Soviet policy in the Far East that currently excite the American reader. While telling what he can of the story—making perhaps excessive use of formal diplomatic materials—Mr. Beloff is also careful to suggest the points at which the story is uncertain or obscure and for which further inquiry will be required.

What the volume is really about is well expressed in its concluding paragraph, where Mr. Beloff suggests that Soviet Far Eastern policy since World War II "provides an apt illustration of the tensions between the Soviet Union as a centre of political power, and the Soviet Union as an agent of world revolution. Soviet statesmanship has as its major task the problem of their reconciliation." Mr. Beloff is not certain, on the basis of present evidence, whether the Soviet failures have balanced the successes in this effort.

H. Arthur Steiner  
*University of California*  
(Los Angeles)

WILLIAM L. HOLLAND (ed.): *Asian Nationalism and the West*. New York, Macmillan Company, 1953. 449 pages. \$5.00.

For several years the Institute of Pacific Relations has been sponsoring a

series of studies concerned with the growth of Asian nationalism, and this present volume grew out of the discussions of that subject at the eleventh conference of the IPR in India in 1950. A very excellent introductory chapter by the editor, which includes excerpts from papers presented to the conference, examines some of the origins of, and trends in, modern Asian nationalism. Three lengthy chapters on Indonesia, Viet-Nam and Malaya follow; the last of these sticks pretty closely to discussing parties, national groups, and independence movements, and the others give a condensed political history of the two countries since 1945. A final chapter summarizes the discussions of the six conference round tables.

There is far too much material in this book to consider it adequately in a short review, but there are several general impressions of long-run significance:

1. Asian nationalist movements have middle-class sources; they found their focus in the demand for independence. Having accomplished that, they are in transition to something else, though the anti-Western attitude of the preindependence era is still a force.

2. In every Asian country today the most vigorous attempts are being made to inculcate nationalist sentiments in all citizens—patriotic demonstrations, language training, national literature, indoctrination through the schools, personal appearances of popular leaders—all are pointed to this end.

3. In nearly every case, political nationalism has associated itself with economic and social reforms, and each successful new independent government has a socialist or "leftist" bias. (One of the round-table participants observed that this is leading to extravagant pro-

grams that Asian countries could not afford and that a "rightist" opposition would be a desirable development.)

4. The nationalist movements, except in Malaya, are of long standing and were neither pro- nor anti-Communist. The Communists sought a place in most of the movements but, with the exception of China and probably Indochina, they either have limited influence or for the present have been rejected.

5. The leaders of the successful nationalist movements are all older men, and there appears to be a lack of vigorous younger men able to assume the leading roles and to hold the supporters together.

6. Independence has not been enough, and there is growing disillusionment over the lack of progress. Violence continues, which means further economic drain as well as a bolstering of the role of the militarist. Was parliamentary government a wise choice for these new states?

7. The greatest contrast in Asian nationalist leadership is between the Communist and non-Communist approach to the problems of China and India. The success or failure of each approach depends upon its success in solving the economic and social problems of the country, and the more successful one is likely to become the model for the rest of Asia.

James R. Roach  
University of Texas

RUSSELL L. ACKOFF: *The Design of Social Research*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953. 420 pages. \$7.50.

This book is primarily concerned

with the methodology of social science research—the logical bases of the organization and conduct of the research project—as contrasted with the concern with specific techniques and procedures to be found in the usual work dealing with the methods of social research. That is not to say that this is merely a “theoretical” consideration of the nature of social science research, for there are careful analyses of the more pressing practical problems of the research—sampling, for example. It is to say that the orientation of the book is toward an overview of the research project, toward a methodology of social research in the sense in which the term has been used by Weber, Merton, and others.

The author has divided the book into four sections. The first three, which are the first three chapters, are devoted to an introduction, to a discussion of the difficulties in the formulation of a meaningful research problem, and to what the author calls the “idealized research design.” The reviewer found the third chapter one of the most interesting in the book. The author presents here an unusual, quasi-operational method of arriving at the definition of terms in common usage in sociology. The fourth section, which consists of the remaining seven chapters, is devoted to what the author has described as the “practical research design.” A part of this is material on statistical techniques, on methods of gathering data, on experimental design, on the administration of research projects, and on similar matters with which experienced researchers are presumably familiar. Some of this material is fresh, and much more has the appearance of freshness because it is presented

in the framework of the somewhat different orientation.

The author and publishers have intended this book for at least some classroom use. There are well-designed discussion topics and exercises at the end of each chapter. The style and explanations are generally clear, and the format is unusually attractive. However, if this book is to be used as a course text, in the opinion of this reviewer, enrollment in such a course should be restricted to the more mature students of sociology, psychology, education, and allied fields, who have some knowledge of research fundamentals. For interested students with these prerequisites, this book would serve admirably as a text. For those no longer students, the reading of this book (and the working of some of the exercises) would be a worthwhile activity, for there are stimulating ideas here.

Donald D. Stewart  
University of Arkansas

AVERY O. CRAVEN: *The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848–1861. A History of the South, Volume VI.* Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press and the Littlefield Fund for Southern History of the University of Texas, 1953. 433 pages. \$6.50.

Mr. Craven has been “building up” to this book for a number of years. While professor of American history at the University of Chicago he devoted much of his attention, and that of a distinguished group of graduate students, to the question of how the South came to secede. Through the years his views have shifted; his grasp of the whole complex field has deepened. And now, at last he presents his conclusions.

It is appropriate that the culmination of his research and reflection makes its appearance as Volume VI of the ten-volume *History of the South Series*, sponsored jointly by the University of Texas and Louisiana State University.

*The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861* is a thorough and thoughtful book. The author considers the mental outlook of the South and the part this outlook played in creating a separate-conscious section—a section with values and rights of its own.

National affairs as they affected the Southern position are carefully examined. So, too, is the Compromise of 1850 and the reaction to it on a nationwide basis. Mr. Craven is careful to point up the importance of the changing position of the United States in world affairs as a factor in driving the South steadily to a firm defense of its way of life—of its "rights."

"Rights" as a Southern demand and "right" as a Northern crusade appear to the author as the central irritants in the whole story. Southerners stumped for "rights"—even if they were abstractions, understandable only to a Calhoun. The North, meanwhile, had been so rapidly changing that a gulf existed between it and the conservative, backward-looking South. What was the cause of this gulf? The answer was there for all to see: the South was shackled by a great moral wrong—"Slavery had gradually become the symbol of all the differences and all the conflicts between the section."

Mr. Craven believes that the "reduction of the story to the simple terms of 'right' versus 'rights' . . . placed issues beyond the abilities of the democratic process and rendered the great masses of men, North and South, helpless before the drift into war."

Lincoln summed it up in a letter to Alexander H. Stephens: "You think slavery is *right* and ought to be extended, while we think it *wrong* and ought to be restricted. That I suppose is the rub."

Considering myriad factors contributing to the rise of a national feeling, Mr. Craven discards the old theory that a reckless minority led the reluctant South to secession. He feels, apparently, that by the time of Lincoln's inauguration, Southern public sentiment was so molded as to make any chance of further concession impossible. Even conservative Southerners were coming to believe that the only chance for the survival of the Southern way of life lay in secession. "Perhaps the American tragedy," says the author, "lies in the way in which attitudes were allowed to develop and in the fearful cost which the nation paid to get itself into the modern world."

Thanks to Mr. Craven's scholarship and understanding, the whole picture of how the South developed a national unity—morally, intellectually, and physically—is far clearer than ever before. The volume reflects the usual high standards of editing of Dr. Wendell H. Stephenson and Dr. E. Merton Coulter, joint editors of the series.

Frank E. Vandiver  
Washington University

ERNEST R. BARTLEY: *The Tidelands Oil Controversy*. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1953. 312 pages. \$5.00.

Of the many episodes in the continual controversy between the states and the federal government over their respective constitutional spheres of opera-

tion, perhaps only the slavery question evoked more intensely partisan public debate than has that of the ownership of offshore submerged lands.

Ernest Bartley has given us an intelligent, readable introduction to the latter controversy. In *United States v. California* the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a 150-year trend of decisions by holding that "California is not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast, and that the Federal Government rather than the state has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil." Explaining in *United States v. Texas* the Court said: "... once low-water mark is passed the international dominion is reached. Property rights must then be so subordinated to political rights as in substance to coalesce and unite in the national sovereign."

Why these pronouncements precipitated such a violent controversy is indicated by a review of the long legal and political tradition that had supported the previous generally accepted contrary view. Mr. Bartley traces the history of the concept of the marginal sea, beginning with the Roman-law notion that the sea was incapable of ownership by anyone. He then examines in turn the broad claims of ownership and control by various countries in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. Finally, beginning in the eighteenth century, he shows the development of the modern concept of a relatively limited area of sea along the coasts which is controllable from the shore and in which fishing is limited to nationals of the littoral state.

This progressive development is outlined principally in the English courts,

and the stage reached at the time of the formation of the United States is shown. Reference is made to the claims of the original states to submerged lands off their coasts, then to the fundamental basis on which the claims of later-admitted coastal states, other than Texas, rested. The author analyzes in detail the California and Texas claims and examines the history of the Congressional and executive policies of the federal government, which, until 1937, regarded the offshore submerged lands as state property. He also follows the efforts in Congress, crystallizing more firmly as the controversy progressed, to confirm to the states the title that they thought they had had all along. The transfer of the controversy from the political to the judicial arena is described, and the three Supreme Court decisions are carefully evaluated and criticized. Mr. Bartley then traces the effect of these decisions in Congress and in the executive departments, and expresses his views as to the wisdom of a quitclaim of the submerged lands to the states and of federal control and development. Here he comments on the efforts expended by the proponents of each of the respective points of view, as well as on the press coverage of the fight.

In the two concluding chapters the implications of the Supreme Court's new doctrine of paramount powers are considered, and the author draws his conclusions from the study.

The book went to press before Congress passed the Submerged Lands Act. Nevertheless, the author sustains the constitutionality of quitclaim legislation, assuming that it would be passed. This is the issue now before the Court in *Alabama v. Texas, et al.* An understanding of the problem in its entirety

is best gleaned from Mr. Bartley's excellent book.

J. Chryst Dougherty  
Austin, Texas

ANTHONY T. BOUSCAREN: *Imperial Communism*. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1953. 256 pages. \$3.75.

In *Imperial Communism* Professor Bouscaren covers the organization, activities, achievements, and failures of the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union. No student of communism can today ignore what—together with the All-Union Communist party, the bureaucracy, the police, and the armed forces—constitutes one of the essential branches of the Soviet governmental structure. Like all imperialistic powers, the Soviet Union owns dependencies. Some consist of territories and their peoples—the satellite states of Eastern Europe and of the Asiatic Far East; in another type of dependency, the geographical element is absent, and what remains are groups of people living in the midst of nations where the majority is opposed to Soviet influence and to Soviet control. A Communist party is a nation within a nation, the long arm of the Soviet power that through Communists and fellow travelers, reaches into most of the world. For a correct evaluation of Soviet strength, one must add to the population, resources, and organization of the Soviet Empire the five or six million Communist party-members outside that Empire, and the twenty to twenty-two million voters who support communism in the countries where free elections take place.

The intent of Professor Bouscaren was excellent. Parts of the book—for instance, the first four chapters, describ-

ing Soviet aims and Soviet policies and the rapid expansion of control in China 1946-49—are very good. Others give the impression that they are based on unreliable or unchecked information and that they were written in a hurry. There are mistakes that careful proof reading would have eliminated. On page 196, the name of the same person is spelled Mosley and Moseley; on page 188 the Spanish Socialist leader Caballero becomes Cabellero; the 250,000 Orthodox Christians who form the flock of the Patriarch of Antioch in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq on page 118 become 500,000 in Syria and Lebanon alone on page 121. More serious than these is the misrepresentation of the political positions held by men and groups that have exercised or that now exercise a good deal of influence in their countries. For instance, every Frenchman would smile at the suggestion that the veteran syndicalist leader Léon Jouhaux is pro-Communist; students of recent European history will be surprised at the political labels attached to some of the leaders of the Spanish Republic, 1931-36; within the wide stream of socialistically-inclined movements, Fabianism is as far from Marxism-Leninism as Unitarians are from Catholics within Christianity. It is a pity that the presentation of a good topic is weakened by this lack of precision and accuracy.

M. Salvadori  
Smith College

BURLEIGH CUSHING RODICK: *American Constitutional Custom*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1953. 244 pages. \$4.75.

This is a very interesting and im-

portant historical study of our constitutional heritage, from colonial beginnings in considerable detail to the administration of Thomas Jefferson and more briefly to that of Abraham Lincoln. The book is largely a proof of the dictatorship of history. It shows that man's experience from the days of the Greeks, whether in religion, economics or politics, has, with less modification than is generally thought, continued to be the basis of his thought and consequently of the establishment of his institutional life. The account is not restricted to English sources, as has generally been true of previous treatises on our traditions, but shows also the importance of Continental influences. It well establishes the thesis that practically every important feature of our constitutional system of government is simply a revised edition of earlier European experience.

The nature of the volume is clearly indicated by its chapter headings: Economic and Social Forces; The Anglo-American Constitutional Tradition (1620-1774); The American Administrative Tradition (1689-1829); Traditional Forces in the American Revolution (1760-1789); Traditional Forces in the Federal Convention and the Document of 1787; Traditional Elements in Early American Constitutional Period; Summary and Conclusion.

This study is very timely in view of the fact that a very vociferous element of our population, though fortunately a minority, wants to discard the traditional elements of American life in economics, religion, and politics. To this group, man has done nothing in the past that is worth keeping or using as a basis of adaptation to the changing needs of society. The verdict of history is that progress has been based on man's

experience. Political science is pre-eminently the science of adapting man's experience. If our forefathers had not been familiar with man's political experience there is little doubt that the document of 1787 would not have been capable of serving without any very fundamental changes as the basis of American political institutions for more than a century and a half, despite the fact that our society has been the most progressive social and political order of which history has any account.

The Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the American Revolution of 1776—the most fundamental events in the history of Anglo-Saxondom—would have been impossible without the doctrine of natural law and its corollary of the contract theory of the state. This philosophy originated in Greece, was passed to the medieval world by Cicero, handed to our forefathers by Milton, Sidney, Harrington, and Locke, and finally incorporated in our Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. The same philosophy found its way into religious institutions through the influence of Thomas Aquinas, Marsilius of Padua, John Huss of Bohemia, and John Wyclif of England, ending with Luther and the Reformation. Roger Williams of Rhode Island was the exponent of this doctrine of democratizing religious institutions.

This is only a sample of the many traditions that are traced through the ages into the character of American institutions. The book is written in an easy style for the general reader. It is of especial value to students of history and political science.

C. Perry Patterson  
*University of Texas*

MARK M. HEALD: *A Free Society: An Evaluation of Contemporary Democracy*. New York, Philosophical Society, 1953. 546 pages. \$4.75.

In the thirties and forties, liberal thinking in this country was concentrated on the expansion of social and economic benefits for more and more people. Problems of economic democracy attracted practically all the attention of liberals, mainly because *political* democracy seemed firmly established. To be sure, there were still shortcomings and imperfections in our political institutions, but on the whole our political democracy had proved a tremendous success, and its continuation could be quietly and implicitly assumed, rather than having to be proved and fought for on a day-to-day basis. In the fifties, however, an increasing number of liberal-minded writers, historians, and philosophers are again turning their attention to the political fundamentals of a democratic society and are rediscovering that the perennial and classical topics of liberalism and democracy are still—or again—the most important topics of political analysis and speculation. Mr. Heald's *A Free Society* is a welcome addition to this process of self-awakening and self-appraisal now going on in this country.

While fully appreciating the impact of modern social and economic forces on the meaning of old democratic values and concepts, Mr. Heald is more interested in preserving the threatened essentials of a free society than in improving this or that aspect of socioeconomic imperfection in the United States. The "zone of personal freedom" is one of the recurring themes in his analysis, and he succeeds in pointing out that the major threats

come from the Right as well as from the Left. He is greatly disturbed by the growing trend toward conformity and orthodoxy, and he holds that the greatest danger to democracy lies less in subversive ideologies than in the "suppression of open self-criticism" that increasingly characterizes our statute books as well as the less formal expressions of public mores.

William Ebenstein  
Princeton University

JOSEPH BUTTINGER: *In the Twilight of Socialism*. Translated by E. B. Ashton. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1953. 577 pages. \$6.00.

This work deals with the birth, development, and collapse of the Revolutionary Socialist party of Austria. It is written by one who evidently had wide and intimate contact with the leaders and events that he describes and it is expressive of the Revolutionary Socialist point of view.

The Revolutionary Socialist party of Austria was the illegal, underground successor to the Social Democratic party. Upon the establishment of the Dollfuss regime, the old Social Democratic leadership led by Otto Bauer went into exile in Brno, leaving behind in Austria a group of young and relatively unknown men upon whom then fell the task of organizing the underground movement. The undertaking was a formidable one, involving as it did the illegal reorganization of the party structure in Vienna and the provinces, the integration of the old lower-level party functionaries into the new system, the maintenance of resistance against the government in power, and the winning over of the old union or-

ganizations to the illegal movement. Perhaps most serious of all was the maintenance of unity between the illegal movement and the party in exile, together with the preservation of internal party unity within Austria itself against the attacks of splinter movements and the Communists.

That the new conditions called for new tactics was admitted by all, but the traditionalists in the party were reluctant to transfer power. The final showdown between the "new men" and the old party leaders came after the defeat of the United Socialist party (Bauer's Compromise Creation) and the reluctant recognition by Brno of the Revolutionary Socialist faction as the official party in Austria. Ultimately Gustav Richter emerged as the dominant figure among the new men, and under his direction the underground movement was welded into a formidable party organization expressive of the new direction in socialist thinking. Successful though Richter's organizational work was, it could not stand against the Nazi power once Hitler took over the Austrian state. The Social Revolutionary leaders who escaped the Brown Terror found themselves forced into exile. Deprived of the basis of their strength, an independent and united party organization in Austria itself, they were no match for the old Social Democratic exiles, and they lived to see their movement crushed at home and their point of view disregarded abroad.

It is with these events that this book deals. It describes in detail the various factional and interparty struggles attendant upon the development of the new movement and thus contributes a unique chapter to the history of socialism in Europe and to the tactics and strategy of underground organization.

The theoretical differences between the old and new socialists, as reflected in their analysis of the historic situation presented by the Austrian development, are ably discussed and their significance for the postwar development of socialism indicated. One of the best chapters is the eighth, in which the philosophy of "pessimism" (Richter and the "new men") and that of "optimism" (Otto Bauer and the traditionalists) are masterfully contrasted. Despite the author's obvious Revolutionary Socialist bias, the book is temperate and fair and constitutes a documentary work of great importance. In fact, it is the only work in English known to this reviewer in which the details of the illegal socialist party in Austria are analysed and discussed in terms of actual personalities and events. It constitutes, therefore, a significant addition to the literature of the European socialism movement.

A few defects may be noted. There are no footnotes or verifiable references except that quotations from newspapers are identified in the text itself by date and name. There is no bibliography of the literature of the underground movement, which, considering the author's evident knowledge, is regrettable. Occasional errors such as the misspelling of names, i.e., Hannack for Hannak, could have been avoided, and lastly there is the failure to identify for American readers the author himself.

However, these failings do not detract from the overriding worth of the book. It is indubitably the most valuable work yet published on the illegal socialist movement in Austria and is of basic value to any student of Austrian or socialist affairs. It is far superior to Jacques Hannak's *Im Sturm eines Jahr-*

*hunderts* or the recent posthumous publication of Renner's *Osterreich von der Ersten zu Zweiten Republik*. For the theoretical and tactical problems of the underground, it is approached only by Otto Bauer's *Die Illegale Partei*, which, however, lacks the warmth of personal detail and the sense of historic tragedy that characterizes Buttinger's work.

H. Malcolm Macdonald  
University of Texas

MARY JOURDAN ATKINSON: *The Texas Indians*. San Antonio, Naylor Company, 1953. 250 pages. \$3.50.

A great deal has been written about Texas Indians, but most of the accounts are either tales of war, plunder, and bloodshed or unsatisfactory and inadequate observations left by travelers and sojourners. Although archaeologists have begun recently to give attention to Texas, the ethnologists have seldom found the subject worthy of their scholarly efforts except for a few specialized monographs.

The scholar who attempts to compress a definitive study of all the Indian cultures of Texas within a single small volume faces an impossible task. Yet, in completely nontechnical style that is easy to read and understand, the author of *The Texas Indians* has succeeded in incorporating within 250 pages an amazing amount of valuable information on the many tribes that inhabited Texas during the period following the arrival of the whites. A judicious selection of materials and considerable ingenuity of organization were essential requirements in accomplishing the task.

From the standpoint of selection, the author has based her study primarily upon actual reportorial accounts of eye-

witnesses—Spanish, German, French, English, and American, generally known to scholars in the field of Texas history. The accounts are quoted extensively and at some length throughout the book without the use of formal citation. They make interesting reading but utilize so disproportionate a part of the context that analysis and evaluation are inadequate. This reviewer felt that too many references were made to the agricultural Indians east of Texas, but this is more a case of semantics than a basic weakness.

To simplify the problem of presentation, the author has organized the tribes into five culture groups or areas: (1) the Mound Builders—the Caddo and the nine nations of the Asinai (Texas)—in the woodlands east of the Trinity; (2) the Fighting Fringe—the Wichita, Waco, Ioni, Anadarko, and Tewakana—immediately west of the Mound Builders and generally east of the Cross Timbers; (3) the Littoral Tribes—the Karankawa and Attacapa—in the Gulf coastal area; (4) the Hill Tribes—the Tonkawa and Coahuilteca—in the Hill Country southwest of the Fighting Fringe; (5) the Plains Tribes—Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache—spread over the vast area west of the Cross Timbers. The number of pages devoted to each group is 127, 8, 12, 11, and 78 respectively.

The ethnology of the five culture groups is presented in thirty chapters, each devoted to some specific cultural pattern or patterns. These short chapters are in turn subdivided with subject or topic headings. As an example, Chapter VII, "The Peace Pipe" (Mound Builders), has listed the following subdivisions: Functions of the Pipe, The Holy Oath, The Peace Pipe, Diplomatic Excursions, The Dance of

Honor, Trade and Barter, Indian Money, Liquid Measurement, The American Esperanto, The Indian Frontier, The Buffalo Treaties, Lowlander vs. Highlander, The International Culture Line, and The Shield of War and the Pipe of Peace.

*The Texas Indians* seems to have been written primarily for the lay reader. In the opinion of this reviewer, it is not a top-level work such as R. H. Lowie's *The Crow Indians* or G. B. Grinnell's *The Cheyenne Indians*, but it is the best single-volume summary dealing with the ethnology of all the Indian tribes of Texas that he has examined. The book should be in every library, and it is recommended reading for those interested in Texas history and Indian culture.

Ernest Wallace  
Texas Technological College

A. H. SHANNON: *The Racial Integrity of the American Negro*. Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press, 1953. 262 pages. \$3.50.

BENJAMIN QUARLES: *The Negro in the Civil War*. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1953. 379 pages. \$5.00.

The reputedly grave menace that the mulatto has been to the full-blooded Negro in business, social, and professional life is the belabored theme of *Racial Integrity*. Washington (D. C.) Negroes provide the source for many of the statistics and observations recorded in the text, which include discussions of religious life, illegitimacy, miscegenation, and politics. In the first eight chapters the author's full sympathy apparently goes out to the Negro. Only in the last two chapters does the

reader fully comprehend that Mr. Shannon's arguments support a theory of colonization as the solution for the American race problem—the problem being, as he sees it, the maintenance of the "racial purity" of the white race.

Theodore G. Bilbo's *Take Your Choice: Segregation or Mongrelization*, though it is not included in Mr. Shannon's very limited bibliography, voiced many of the same arguments and is far more readable. Students of American society who choose to use the "scientific method" in their research will challenge much in this volume, but it may be of interest to some in that it represents the thinking of at least a segment of our population.

Benjamin Quarles has focused attention on the role played by the Negro in the Civil War as a laborer, spy, nurse, soldier, and aspirant for freedom. In emphasizing the Negro's active participation in the war, the author has chosen to relate incidents that reflect a statement found in the Foreword: "Without slavery there would have been no resort to arms. Hence the slave was the key factor in the war."

Only five battles (Wagner, Port Hudson, Milliken's Bend, Nashville, and Petersburg) of the more than fifty in which Negroes participated are described. However, considerable attention is given to other facets of military life, notably the challenge to the Negro to prove his fighting capacity and the prejudices against accepting him as a soldier. Free Negroes, from both the North and the South, and ex-slaves increased the Union Army strength by some 180,000 troops and the Navy by 29,000. Their fondest hope was to prove that they could and would fight. Union strength was augmented further by Negroes who served as laborers

attached to the armies, factory workers, women nurses, and informants as to Confederate movements.

Historians will criticize this work primarily because of the lack of perspective in the valuable information that the author has uncovered. The proof is insufficient to obtain for the Negro the "key" role in the war. Generalizations such as the oft-repeated claim that Louisiana Negroes were guaranteed citizenship rights in the Transfer Treaty of 1803 are misleading. Louisiana inhabitants were guaranteed United States citizenship rights, and certainly Negroes thought of themselves as "inhabitants," but no specific mention was made of the Negro, free or slave, in this document.

Donald E. Everett  
Trinity University

VINCENT OSTROM: *Water and Politics: A Study of Water Policies and Administration in the Development of Los Angeles*. Los Angeles, Haynes Foundation, 1953. 297 pages. Cloth-bound, \$4.00; paperbound, \$3.50.

VINCENT OSTROM: *Water Supply*. Number VIII in a monograph series by various authors on Metropolitan Los Angeles. Los Angeles, Haynes Foundation, 1953. Cloth bound \$2.75; paperbound, \$2.25.

The second of these studies duplicates much of the earlier one, as the author so states, with the exception that the final chapter of the second and briefer book includes a more thorough examination of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California.

The reviewer believes that the general student of water resources will prefer the first study, especially the

last three chapters, which are titled "Water and the Development of Metropolitan Government," "Colorado River Controversies," and "Conclusions and Observations."

Here are some of Professor Ostrom's conclusions: (1) "Once a city has exhausted its water supply, it has available new resources in wealth and human imagination to overcome the previously existing limits." (2) The interstate compact device for controlling the development of the Colorado River has proved unsuccessful. (3) The state government of California has not arrived at "an adequate determination of goals to establish a resource program to accomplish its purposes." (4) The TVA approach would not be desirable in other regions, as neither the choice of directors nor the financing of the projects comes entirely from the region concerned. (5) The water resources program of the Colorado River region might be administered better by a federal, "municipal type" corporation similar to the Metropolitan Water District that serves Southern California. Such a corporation would have independent fiscal control over operating revenues, have the power to tax property in the region, and be empowered to issue revenue and general obligation bonds. The reviewer feels that Arizona would demand that the voting power of California in such a corporation would have to be limited, just as Los Angeles was restricted to 50 per cent or less of the votes in the Metropolitan Water District.

Comer Clay  
Texas Christian University

ROGER J. WILLIAMS: *Free and Unequal*. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1953. 177 pages. \$3.50.

Dr. Roger J. Williams, director of the Biochemical Institute of the University of Texas, refuses to confine himself to the field in which he is most distinguished. In *Free and Unequal* he makes a second excursion into the subject of human behavior and society, following *The Human Frontier*, published in 1946. In his second book, as in his first, he develops a central theme as if he were composing a symphony and repeats it with variations until he arrives at the impressive finale. This theme is that as no two human beings are alike the solution to many of the world's problems lies in the recognition of this fact.

Particles of inorganic matter of a single chemical composition are identical. The forms of the simplest living organisms are nearly so. The more complex an organism, the greater its individual variability. This principle is carried on to that most variable of creatures, man. The increase in variability that accompanies evolution is one of its causes. Human variability is a product of heredity. Mass education, the attempts of educators to teach the same subjects in the same fashion to all children, the discouragement of the gifted individual, are harmful to the progress of civilization and to peace within and between nations.

In his social planning, Karl Marx did not consider heredity a factor to be dealt with seriously. The environmentalist school, which many American social anthropologists follow, is rooted in totalitarianism. Attempts to gloss over racial differences as mere color phases of man fail to take cognizance or advantage of racial capabilities and ignore the immense individual variation within races. History was made by individuals, not by a generalized crea-

ture known as man. Educators, medical men, legislators, and international negotiators must take individual variation into account if their works are to be successful.

Dr. Williams refers to the tragic loss of his wife following medical treatment that failed to consider her individual characteristics. While his personal misfortune may have inspired and sharpened to a certain extent his point of view, this nevertheless remains a sound one. In order to express my own individual variability I should be able to find something with which I disagree in this book, but I cannot manage it. This reviewer varies little from the author in his attitude toward the variability, integrity, and value of the individual man. The book is well written and its theme logically developed. I hope that it will help defeat the current environmentalist school of thought that many of our social scientists fail to recognize as the echo of a discarded party line.

Carleton S. Coon  
University of Pennsylvania Museum

JOHN FRANCIS BANNON: *History of the Americas*. 2 volumes. New York, McGraw-Hill Company. 1150 pages. \$11.00.

This two-volume *History of the Americas*, 1492-1952, will fit well with the idea of progressive education. To condense into two volumes the history of Canada, the United States, and twenty Spanish American countries (including Brazil), plus the history of pre-Columbian America, is a task that only a "progressive" educator would undertake. The result can be guessed.

The first volume contains thirty-five chapters—the first nine on pre-Colum-

bian history, the opening of the New World, and the establishment of the Spanish Empire overseas; two on the founding of Brazil; two on the beginnings of New France; two on the New England colonies; and one on the Dutch. The remaining chapters cover the development, expansion, and life in the French, English, Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch colonies in North and South America; the elimination of the Dutch and French by the English; the Anglo-American Revolution; and the struggle for independence of Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the Americas.

Needless to say, the result is a patch quilt of hurriedly and not always discretely organized facts, strung together by hasty and sometimes misleading generalizations. One wonders why the author did not stick to his previous book, *Latin America, An Historical Survey*. The history of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the Americas, from the discovery to the present, is vast enough in itself to forbid inclusion of the British and French enterprises, plus the subsequent history of the United States and Canada.

Volume II carries on the tale of history since the independence of the United States, the twenty Ibero-American republics, and of Canada as a British Commonwealth, bringing the account up to the present. Too much for any one volume, if justice is to be done to any of the component parts. The effort is heroic, and the reader cannot but marvel at the amount of success attained in condensation. But in the final analysis, this, as the first volume, becomes little more than superficial enumeration and listing of facts and great events, with little additional data or details to help the student or

reader to an understanding of the events listed.

In all justice, it needs to be said that as a textbook for high schools, many colleges, and even universities where such broad, sweeping fields are covered in a one-year course, the two volumes have undoubted merit. When all things are considered, the stupendous condensation has been done judiciously as a whole. The two volumes are an excellent source for quick reference—somewhat like a manual or an abridged encyclopedia. The facts are presented concisely and even the skimpy interpretation is better than most in recent books on Latin America. Here is a telling example of the effect on history-teaching of the great pressures of progressive education.

Valdemar Rodriguez  
University of Texas

VERGILIUS FERM (ed.): *Puritan Sage: Collected Writings of Jonathan Edwards*. New York, Library Publishers, 1953. 640 pages. \$7.50.

The chairman of the Department of Philosophy of Wooster College, already the author or editor of some fifteen books in the fields of philosophy and religion, has placed several disciplines in his debt by editing the present convenient volume. It includes the whole of, or extensive excerpts from, twenty-seven essays and sermons, plus five significant letters. The arrangement is generally chronological, extending from Edwards' youthful treatise on flying spiders to fragments from the uncompleted *History of the Work of Redemption*, which he reluctantly put aside to accept the presidency of the College of New Jersey (now Princeton).

The compact form of this volume encourages the reader to go straight through its contents. In this process he is likely to be particularly impressed with the fact that the mind and outlook of Edwards remained essentially unchanged throughout his career, seeking out no new channels but continually deepening old ones. There is a steadfast self-confidence, almost intellectual arrogance, that never confesses before any human tribunal any doubt as to the correctness of his own conclusions. In spite of his borrowings from Newtonian science and Lockian philosophy to buttress his arguments, he remained essentially a medieval scholastic. It is not surprising, therefore, that modern readers can be impressed with the skillful evolutions of his reasoning and at the same time remain completely unmoved by his conclusions.

The editor has wisely refrained from extensive notes, since the excellent biography by Ola Elizabeth Winslow and the intellectual analyses by Perry Miller are easily available as reference aids. But the introduction briefly recounts the circumstances under which each piece was written and, where needed, provides guide posts to assist in arriving at the meaning.

Wood Gray  
George Washington University

B. S. KEIRSTEAD: *An Essay in the Theory of Profits and Income Distribution*. Oxford, England, Basil Blackwood, 1953. 110 pages. \$1.75.

In this essay Professor Keirstead, author of *Essentials of Price Theory* and *The Theory of Economic Change*, undertakes to show that the redistribution of income that has taken place in

recent decades, especially in England, has been due in large measure to the "natural" economic processes of a "progressive society," by which "the distribution of total income is altered in favor of the labouring class and the entrepreneurial class." Following Schumpeter, he identifies entrepreneurial gains with innovations that are the mainspring of progress, though he also takes into account gains arising from monopoly positions. He argues that in the distribution of such gains entrepreneurs enjoy an advantage over suppliers of capital funds and that organized skilled labor enjoys an advantage over other groups.

Thus a redistributive tax-policy serves to a considerable extent as an accelerator of a tendency already present in a progressive economy as a function of innovation. It will, of course, "tend to curb the gains of the entrepreneurial class and to improve, by the provision of free collective goods, the share in real income of the working class." But if it "does not go far enough to discourage innovation . . ." the gains of the laboring class will be shared by all others—even, it seems, by the entrepreneurs. With regard to the latter, Professor Keirstead implies (but only implies) that redistribution will stimulate demand and therefore production and that, in the long run, entrepreneurs will be better off than before by reason of a more rapidly expanding economy.

C. E. Ayres  
University of Texas

ELIZABETH KELLEY BAUER: *Commentaries on the Constitution, 1790-1860*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1952. 400 pages. \$4.75.

For the student of American constitutional history, this study of the pre-Civil War commentators and commentaries on the United States Constitution may fill a significant gap. Approximately half of the work is biographical, the remainder being concerned with the commentaries and their contemporary use, particularly as textbooks and in the courts.

The commentators discussed are grouped into New England Nationalists, commentators of the Middle States, and the States-Rights school of the South. In the biographical surveys and in the analyses of the works of the more significant representatives of these schools, the author goes over familiar ground in contrasting the views of the commentators with respect to sovereignty and states' rights versus national supremacy. Joseph Story comes in for special—but not especially original—treatment.

Although Miss Bauer discusses contemporary uses of the *Commentaries*, it is regrettable that no attempt is made to show the impact of the more important of them, particularly those of the Federalists and Nationalists, upon later American constitutional development.

Delavan P. Evans  
Washington, D. C.

JOHN R. MORTON: *University Extension in the United States*. University of Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1953. 144 pages. \$2.25.

This study is a useful contribution for those who would like to orient themselves with respect to general university extension. It has enough statistical material to indicate the extent of

the various activities in the member institutions of the National University Extension Association as a whole.

The study leaves something to be desired in indicating how the program functions in the several member institutions. To an extent it is true that the various programs, most of which were developed during the first two decades of this century, followed the pattern set by the University of Wisconsin, under the leadership of L. E. Reber, dean of the Extension Division of Wisconsin at that time. It is also true that the programs of the several universities and colleges were in a very important sense, in the earlier years, the lengthening shadows of those who had planned and developed them. No longer, however, is this true. Programs have outgrown the vision of one man or group of men. Increase in existing services and new services are now the result of needs and demands of the people and the groups served, as interpreted by those in charge of the extension program.

In view of these facts, there is need for a detailed study of the programs themselves of the several member institutions. This basic study points the way to a more detailed study of the way in which the program functions in the several institutions.

Dr. Morton is to be commended for doing a good job with a difficult assignment. It is hoped many more studies of extension programs will follow.

T. H. Shelby  
University of Texas

W. BROOKE GRAVES: *American State Government*. Fourth edition. Boston, D. C. Heath & Company, 1953. 946 pages. \$6.25.

Any writer on American state government faces the problem of treating a subject that is ostensibly homogeneous but actually so diverse in detail that he must either speak in broad generalities or go to some length to point out essential likenesses without omitting mention of particular differences. In his fourth edition of *American State Government*, W. Brooke Graves tackles this problem and handles the subject most admirably. This new edition should augment his deserved reputation as author of one of the most dependable compendiums in the field. Although it is perhaps somewhat overpowering in content and length for the average undergraduate, the fact that it treats of almost every phase of state government makes it easy for the instructor to excerpt desired portions and omit those not wanted. Worthwhile new chapters include "Legislative Service Agencies," "The Military Establishment and Civilian Defense," and "County and Municipal Government." Within the limitations implicit in the subject, the style is easy and engaging. The chapter bibliographies are kept within useful bounds. Anyone interested in this field can readily find the work useful.

James A. Hankerson, Jr.  
Texas Research League

## Other Books Received

*Alcoholism*. Frankfort, Legislative Research Commission, 1953. 38 pages.

The American Academy of Political and Social Science: *The Impact of Atomic Energy*. The Annals, November, 1953. Philadelphia, The American Academy of Political

and Social Science, 1953. 206 pages. \$2.00.

Bertrand, Alvin L.: *Older Youth in Rural Louisiana: Their Number, Characteristics and Needs*. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, Agricultural Experiment Station, 1953. 51 pages.

Calhoun, Leonard J.: *The International Labor Organization and United States Domestic Law*. New York and Washington, American Enterprise Association, 1953. 49 pages. \$.50.

*Cerebral Palsy in Kentucky: A Study of the State's Orthopedically Handicapped Children*. Frankfort, Research Staff, Legislative Research Commission, 1953. 63 pages.

*A Foundation Program for Education: Staff Analysis of Advisory Committee Recommendations*. Frankfort, Research Staff, Legislative Research Commission, 1953. 42 pages.

Kilpatrick, Wylie: *Revenue and Debt of Florida Municipalities and Overlying Governments*. Gainesville, University of Florida, Bureau of Economic and Business Research and Public Administration Clearing Service, 1953. 76 pages.

Laucks, Irving F.: *A Speculation in Reality*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1953. 154 pages. \$3.75.

Lloyd, Arthur Y.: *Education: The Finance Problem*. A report to the Committee on Functions and Resources of State Government. Frankfort, Legislative Research Commission, 1952. 43 pages.

- Matthews, Herbert L., and Lula T. Holmes: *The U. S. and Latin America*. No. 100 in Headline Series. New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1953. 62 pages. \$.35.
- New York State Department of Education: *Rural Leadership and Service: A Study of the District Superintendency*. (Part II, Structure.) Albany, New York State Department of Education, 1953. 63 pages.
- New York State Department of Education: *Using Electricity: A Resource Unit for a Course in Physical Science*. Bureau of Secondary Curriculum Development, 1953. 120 pages.
- Poirot, Paul L.: *Bargaining*. New York, Foundation for Economic Education, Inc., 1953. 54 pages. Six copies, \$1.00.
- Powrys, John Cowper: *In Spite Of: A Philosophy for Everyman*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1953. 312 pages. \$5.00.
- Russell, Dean: *My Freedom Depends on Yours*. New York, Foundation for Economic Education, 1953. 30 pages. Six copies, \$1.00.
- A Standard Classification of Municipal Accounts*. No. 17. June 1953. Chicago, National Committee on Governmental Accounting, 1953. 129 pages.
- Stewart, Donald D., and A. Stephen Stephan (eds.): *Southwestern Sociological Society: Proceedings of the Annual Meetings*. Fayetteville, University of Arkansas, 1953. 192 pages.
- Wallis, Louis: *Young People's Hebrew History*. New York, Philosophical Library, 1953. 117 pages. \$2.50.
- Weeks, O. Douglas: *Texas Presidential Politics in 1952*. Austin, Institute of Public Affairs, 1953. 116 pages. \$1.25.

# Preliminary Program Annual Convention

THE SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION and THE AMERICAN BUSINESS WRITING ASSOCIATION (Southwest Section), Friday, Saturday, April 16-17, 1954. *General Headquarters:* Hotel Adolphus, Dallas, Texas

## *Thursday Evening, April 15*

Meeting of the Executive Council of the Southwestern Social Science Association, 7:30 P.M.

## *Friday Morning, April 16*

### ACCOUNTING SECTION

8:30 A.M. (*Titles of papers to be announced*)

1. Tom Rose, North Texas State College
2. Reginald Rushing, Texas Technological College
3. D. M. Smith, University of New Mexico
4. James M. Owen, Louisiana State University
5. Emerson Henke, Baylor University
6. J. E. Hodges, Rice Institute
7. William S. Knight, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute

### AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS SECTION

8:15 A.M.

*Chairman:* John White, University of Arkansas

*General Topic:* "Agricultural Price Policy"

1. "Causes of Recent Price Declines," Tyrus Timm, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas
2. "What Kind of Price Recession Will

We Have?" B. M. Gile, Louisiana State University

3. "Price-Support Programs," O. R. Johnson, University of Missouri
4. Discussion: L. P. Jenkins, Mississippi State College; H. J. Meenen, University of Arkansas

10:30 A.M.

*Chairman:* R. J. Saville, Mississippi State College

*General Topic:* "Adjustments in Farming under Control Programs." Discussion: W. F. Lagrone, United States Agricultural Marketing Service; F. H. Wiegmann, Louisiana State University; F. L. Underwood, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College; E. C. Jones, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute; Troy Mullins, United States Agricultural Marketing Service

### BUREAU OF BUSINESS RESEARCH SECTION

*To be announced*

### BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION SECTION

*To be announced*

### ECONOMICS SECTION

9:00 A.M.

*Chairman:* Domenico Gagliardo, University of Kansas

*General Topic: "Issues in Old-Age Insurance"*

1. "An Introductory Discussion of Problems and Issues," Domenico Gagliardo, University of Kansas
2. "A Program for Old-Age Insurance," Emerson Schmidt, United States Chamber of Commerce
3. "A Program for Old-Age Insurance," Leonard Lesser, United Automobile Workers of America, CIO

10:30 A.M.

*Chairman:* Charles Prather, University of Texas*General Topic: "Issues in Federal Tax Policies"*

1. "The Setting of the Problem," Charles Prather, University of Texas
2. "Issues in Federal Corporate Taxation," W. D. Ross, Louisiana State University
3. "Issues in Federal Personal-Income Taxation," Richard Johnson, Southern Methodist University, Texas
4. "Issues in Federal Excise Taxation," Aurelius Morgner, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas

## GEOGRAPHY SECTION

9:00 A.M.

*Chairman:* Donald Brand, University of Texas

1. "Physical Geography of Powder River Basin of Wyoming and Montana," C. C. Bajza, Texas College of Arts and Industries
2. "The Grain-Hay-Livestock Middle West," W. A. Brown, Northeast Missouri State Teachers College
3. "Conservation and the Nature of Social Problems," W. R. Brueckheimer, Southern State College, Arkansas
4. "Geographers, Why Be Gullible?" W. T. Chambers, Stephen F. Austin State College, Texas

## 5. Business meeting

## GOVERNMENT SECTION

9:00 A.M.

*Chairman:* H. Malcolm Macdonald, University of Texas*General Topic: "American Civil Liberties and National Security"*

1. "Freedom and Order: The Crisis of Liberalism," Walter E. Sandelius, University of Kansas
2. "Security Policy and the United States Constitution," Charles W. Procter, Texas Christian University
3. "Loyalty, Security, and the Climate of Opinion," Joseph C. Pray, University of Oklahoma
4. Discussion: J. William David, Texas Technological College; T. C. Sinclair, University of Houston; Wilbourn E. Benton, Southern Methodist University

## HISTORY SECTION

8:30 A.M. Faculty Club, Atkins Hall, Southern Methodist University

*Chairman:* James Taylor, Southwest Texas State Teachers College*General Topic: "European History"*

1. "Historical Implications of Early Medieval Population Changes," Josiah C. Russell, University of New Mexico
2. "Rationalism and Empiricism in the Eighteenth-Century Enlightenment," Willis B. Glover, Southern Methodist University
3. "A Tennessee Politician's Impressions of Imperial Russia, 1850-1853," Joseph O. Baylen, New Mexico Highlands University
4. "Napoleon's Attempts to Influence Opinion in Satellite Countries," Robert B. Holtman, Louisiana State University

5. Discussion: Archibald R. Lewis, University of Texas, and others

10:30 A.M. Faculty Club, Atkins Hall, Southern Methodist University

*Chairman:* Floyd F. Ewing, Jr., Midwestern University, Texas

*General Topic:* "Latin-American History"

1. "The Indian as a Factor in the Basic Background of American History," W. J. Hammond, Texas Christian University
  2. "Bolivar and His Influence on Pan-Americanism," T. H. Reynolds, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College
  3. "General Francisco Villa and the Agrarian Movement in Mexico, 1913-1915," John H. McNeely, Texas Western College
  4. "Chinese Coolie Labor in Cuba," Marshall K. Powers, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute
5. Discussion: Don J. Berthrong, University of Oklahoma; Herbert Gambrell, Southern Methodist University; and others

#### SOCIOLOGY SECTION

8:30 A.M.

*Chairman:* Sandor B. Kavacs, University of Tulsa

*General Topic:* "Marriage and the Family"

1. "The Marriage and the Family Course: Theory and Practice," Charles D. Johnson, Baylor University
2. "San Blas Indians," Marion B. Smith, Louisiana State University
3. "Family Social Status and Parental Authority Evaluations among Adolescents," Leonard G. Benson, North Texas State College

10:00 A.M. Business meeting

10:45 A.M.

*Chairman:* Alvin L. Bertrand, Louisiana State University

*General Topic:* "Social Disorganization"

1. "Alcoholism and Anomie: Pathological Drinking in Communal and Associational Societies," Elwin H. H. Powell, Tulane University of Louisiana
2. "Some Problems of Technological Change in Rural Ethiopia," Joseph S. Vandiver, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College
3. "Differences in the Incidence of Mental Illness in Two Arkansas Counties," Donald D. Stewart, University of Arkansas
4. "Prison Personalities," Rupert C. Koeninger, Sam Houston State Teachers College, and Bureau of Classification, Texas Prison System

#### SOCIOLOGY STUDENT SECTION

10:00 A.M.

*Chairman:* Rosenwald Altheimer, Agricultural, Mechanical, and Normal College, Arkansas

1. *To be announced*
2. "Some Correlates of Empathy," Vernon H. Edmond, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College
3. Business session
4. "Some Ecological Aspects of Little Rock," Meyer Titus, Philander Smith College, Arkansas

#### AMERICAN BUSINESS WRITING ASSOCIATION

8:30 A.M.

*Registration*

*Invocation*

*Vice-President's Welcome*

1. *To be announced*
2. Discussion: "The Challenge in Mail-Order Letters—Acknowledg-

ments, Complaints, and Adjustments." Chairman: Virginia Baker Long, Southern Methodist University

### *Friday Luncheons*

#### ACCOUNTING LUNCHEON

12:30 P.M.

*Master of Ceremonies:* Leo Herbert, Assistant State Auditor, Louisiana

#### GEOGRAPHY LUNCHEON

12:30 P.M.

#### HISTORY LUNCHEON

12:30 P.M. Faculty Club, Atkins Hall, Southern Methodist University

*Chairman:* Rupert N. Richardson, Hardin-Simmons University, Texas

*Address:* Carlos E. Castañeda, University of Texas, "Unsuspected Nuggets Found at Random: Sources of the History of the Southwest"

#### SOCIAL SCIENCE INTRODUCTORY COURSE LUNCHEON

12:00 M.

*Chairman:* Clarence E. Ayres, University of Texas

*Speakers:* E. S. Redford, University of Texas; R. B. Melton, North Texas State College; Clay Malick, University of Colorado

#### AMERICAN BUSINESS WRITING ASSOCIATION

12:15 P.M.

*Luncheon:* "In Gay Paree"

*Speaker:* C. R. Anderson, University of Illinois

### *Friday Afternoon, April 16*

#### ACCOUNTING SECTION

2:00 P.M.

*Chairman:* R. S. Barton, Applied Science, IBM.

*General Topic:* "Electronic Accounting Today"

1. Discussion and a demonstration on an IBM 701.
2. Business session.

#### AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS SECTION

2:00 P.M.

*Chairman:* Tyrus Timm, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas

*General Topic:* "Livestock Problems"

1. "Improving Market Facilities," George Turner, Marketing and Facilities Research Branch, United States Agricultural Marketing Service
2. "Problems in Making Livestock Estimates," A. V. Nordquist, Agricultural Estimates Division, United States Agricultural Marketing Service
3. "Mysteries in Livestock Market News," J. G. McNeely, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas
4. Discussion: R. B. Johnson, Louisiana Department of Agriculture; Hilliard Jackson, University of Arkansas; J. W. Bennett, Texas Technological College
5. Business meeting

#### BUREAU OF BUSINESS RESEARCH SECTION

*To be announced*

#### BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION SECTION

*To be announced*

#### ECONOMICS SECTION

2:00 P.M.

*Chairman:* Nathaniel Wollman, University of New Mexico

*General Topic:* "The Development of a Water Policy in the Southwest"

1. "A Statement of the Problems," Nathaniel Wollman, University of New Mexico

2. "The Role of the Federal Government," Harry P. Burleigh, United States Bureau of Reclamation
3. "Policies of the State of Texas, Past and Prospective," H. A. Beckwith, Texas Board of Water Engineers
4. "The Role of Private Enterprise," J. B. Thomas, Texas Electric Service Company
5. Concluding discussion: "Co-ordination and Conflict," Walter Firey, University of Texas

4:30 P.M. Business meeting

#### GEOGRAPHY SECTION

2:00 P.M.

*Chairman:* Tom L. McNight, Southern Methodist University. Urban-industrial field trip in Dallas or Dallas-Fort Worth area

#### GOVERNMENT SECTION

2:00 P.M.

*Chairman:* J. M. Claunch, Southern Methodist University

*General Topic:* "American Federalism: A Re-examination"

1. "Realizable Values in Local, State, and Federal Co-operation in Providing Adequate Highways," Thomas H. MacDonald, Texas Engineering Experiment Station
2. "Organization for Civil Defense and Disaster Relief," William L. McGill, Texas Division of Defense and Disaster Relief
3. "Prospects for Federal Decentralization," Byron R. Abernethy, Texas Technological College
4. Discussion: H. W. Kamp, Jr., North Texas State College; O. A. Grant, Tarleton State College, Texas; Comer Clay, Texas Christian University

4:30 P.M. Business meeting

#### HISTORY SECTION

2:30 P.M. Faculty Club, Atkins Hall, Southern Methodist University

*Chairman:* Rob Roy MacGregor, Oklahoma City University

*General Topic:* "Southwestern and State History"

1. Business meeting. Presiding: Lynn I. Perrigo, New Mexico Highlands University
2. "The Texas Senatorial Campaign of 1948," S. S. McKay, Texas Technological College
3. "James Bowie and the Reverend Benjamin Chase," Bevington Reed, Sul Ross State College
4. "The Ferguson War on the University of Texas," R. W. Steen, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas
5. "Prolegomenon to the Historical Study of States of the American Union," Fulmer Mood, University of Texas
6. Discussion: William H. Masterson, Rice Institute; L. A. McGee, Sam Houston State Teachers College; Frank D. Reeve, University of New Mexico; J. D. Bragg, Baylor University

#### SOCIOLOGY SECTION

2:00 P.M.

*Chairman:* Walter T. Watson, Southern Methodist University

*General Topic:* "Research Methods"

1. "A Method for Scoring Patterns of Responses to Biographical Inventory Items," Bruce M. Pringle, Southern Methodist University
2. "The Concept of Social Visibility in the Study of Race and Ethnic Group Relations," Joseph K. Johnson, Southern Illinois University
3. "The Development of the Scale of Urbanism Applicable to Individ-

- uals," Norman F. Washburne, Southern State College, Arkansas
4. "The Comparative Method in Sociology," Gideon Sjöberg, University of Texas
5. "Eight Years Later: Proposal for a Resurvey of a Group of Morons in a Middle-sized Connecticut Town," Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy, Connecticut College

3:30 P.M.

*Chairman:* Ezra W. Geddes, University of New Mexico

*General Topic:* "Social Psychology"

1. "A Comparison of Church Attitudes Studied in a White Girls' College with Those of a Negro College," W. R. Harrison, Southern University, Louisiana
2. "Expectancy Theory in Social Psychology," Roger J. Weldon, University of New Mexico
3. "Arkansas Farmers' Attitudes toward Their Co-operative Purchasing Organizations," William S. Folkman, University of Arkansas
4. "Adolescent Role Behavior and Age-Mate Acceptance," Carson McGuire, George D. White, and Edwin Novak, University of Texas

#### SOCIOLOGY STUDENT SECTION

1:00 P.M.

*Chairman:* President-Elect, Student Section

1. "Résumé of Some Community Studies," Anna Faye Stewart, Southwestern Louisiana Institute.
2. "Organization Approach of the Social Sciences in the Application to Psychological Warfare," Eugene Smith, Trinity University, Texas
3. "A Study of the Gospel-Singing Conventions of Rusk County, Texas," James L. Bynum, Southern Methodist University

#### 4. To be announced

#### AMERICAN BUSINESS WRITING ASSOCIATION

2:15 P.M.

*Discussion:* "Training Personnel for Routine Correspondence"

*Chairman:* Nelda R. Lawrence, University of Houston; Fred L. Haynes, Dictaphone Corporation; Millard Collins, IBM Corporation

#### Friday Evening, April 16

7:00 P.M. Conference dinner

*Presiding:* P. F. Boyer, first vice-president, Louisiana State University

*President's Address:* Carl M. Rosenquist, University of Texas

*Conference Address:* T. V. Smith, Syracuse University. Professor Smith is eminently known for his works in moral and political philosophy, the democratic tradition in America, and his inquiries in constructive ethics.

#### Saturday Morning, April 17

8:00 A.M. General business meeting

#### ACCOUNTING SECTION

9:00 A.M. (*Topics to be announced*)

1. John A. White, University of Texas
2. O. J. Curry, North Texas State College
3. Paul J. Graber, University of Tulsa
4. John A. Kane, University of Arkansas
5. Ralph C. Russell, Texas College of Arts and Industries
6. Jim G. Ashburne, University of Texas
7. I. E. McNeill, University of Houston

#### AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS SECTION

8:45 A.M.

*Chairman:* Archie Leonard, Texas Technological College

*General Topic:* "Getting Economic Information into Use"

*Discussion:* C. H. Bates, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas; Joe Campbell, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas; A. W. Jacob, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College; George Townsend, National Cotton Council

10:15 A.M.

*Chairman:* Peter Nelson, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College

*General Topic:* "New Techniques in Research and Teaching"

*Discussion:* W. E. Paulson, Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas; J. M. Baker, Louisiana State University; E. E. Kern, Mississippi State College

#### BUREAU OF BUSINESS RESEARCH SECTION

*To be announced*

#### BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION SECTION

*To be announced*

#### ECONOMICS SECTION

9:00 A.M.

*Chairman:* Stephen L. McDonald, University of Texas

*General Topic:* "The Interest Rate and National Income"

1. "The Interest Rate and Its Effect on Private Investment and International Transactions," E. M. Bernstein, International Monetary Fund
2. "The Interest Rate and Consumption," W. Nelson Peach, University of Oklahoma
3. "The Interest Rate and Government Expenditures," Ervin Zingler, University of Houston
4. "Summary and Conclusions," the Chairman

#### GEOGRAPHY SECTION

9:00 A.M. (*Titles of papers to be announced*)

1. S. A. Arbingast, University of Texas
2. L. Kennamer, East Texas State Teachers College
3. T. L. McKnight, Southern Methodist University
4. E. J. Foscue, Southern Methodist University
5. G. M. Harrel, East Central State College, Oklahoma
6. E. E. Hoy, University of Oklahoma
7. D. D. Brand, University of Texas

#### GOVERNMENT-HISTORY SECTIONS (joint meeting)

9:00 A.M.

*Chairman:* Escal F. Duke, Hardin-Simmons University, Texas

*General Topic:* "The East-West Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect"

1. "Russian Succession Crises," Alfred Levin, Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College
2. "Is Pacific Settlement of the Cold War Possible?" Peter J. Fliess, Louisiana State University
3. "One Year without Stalin," Eduard Taborsky, University of Texas
4. Discussion: Rufus G. Hall, University of Oklahoma; Chang Wook Moon, Texas Wesleyan University; W. A. Stephenson, Hardin-Simmons University, Texas; Oliver Radkey, University of Texas

#### SOCIOLOGY SECTION

9:00 A.M.

*Chairman:* Warren Breed, Tulane University of Louisiana

*General Topic:* "Communication"

1. "Norms and Values: A Study in Confusion," Franz Adler, University of Arkansas

2. "Interpersonal Relations among a Group of Institutionalized Delinquent Girls: An Example of Informal Communication," Reed M. Powell, University of Oklahoma
3. "Communications and Mental Disorder," Charles D. Watley, Jr., North Texas State College
4. "Bad News: A Study of the Newspaper Handling of News of the Waco Tornado of 1953," Harry E. Moore, University of Texas
5. Discussion: Thomas Ktsanes, Tulane University of Louisiana

10:45 A.M. Business meeting

AMERICAN BUSINESS WRITING ASSOCIATION

9:00 A.M.

1. "Television Potentials in the Field of Communication," John C. Schwarzwald, Station KUHT-TV, University of Houston
2. "Salesmanship Supreme—Selling the Value of Business Writing," John W. Eaton, Northern Illinois State Teachers College
3. Discussion: "Report Grading—Evaluation of Student Reports." Virginia Reva, University of New Mexico; Raymond V. Lesikar, University of Texas

